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Abstract 
 
 As the cost of DoD Weapon Systems continue to increase, the ability to more 
accurately predict the Operating and Support (O&S) costs for the various weapon 
systems has become more vital for long run affordability. The investigation into the O&S 
arena has been overshadowed by the research and development (R&D) and acquisition 
fields. This research focuses on the O&S portion of the total life cycle costs, specifically 
the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure (CES) elements and sub-elements. The research 
investigates seven categories of 52 aircrafts and their cost expenditures within the CES 
from the years 1996-2016. The first portion of the analysis investigates the descriptive 
statistics for the 52 aircrafts and their respective categories. The second portion focused 
on utilizing statistical tests to compare and contrasts the findings from question one to 
illustrate the similarities and differences by cost expenditures depending on aircraft 
category. Lastly, we investigate if the elements/sub-elements could be used as metrics to 
each other through a multivariate correlation analysis. DoD Cost Estimators and 
stakeholders alike can benefit from this research by utilizing the results as baselines for 
future analogy based estimates.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
The United States Air Force (USAF) mission is to ensure unmatched capabilities 
in air, space and cyberspace. To accomplish this, a major focus since the inception of the 
Air Force has been the acquisition and procurement of aircraft, which ensures superior air 
capability and performance globally. Cost was often relegated as a secondary 
consideration to performance. While this approach has been strategically and 
operationally advantageous it has not been without long-term financial consequences. 
This approach has historically emphasized short-term costs (e.g. research and 
development or procurement) at the expense of long-term affordability considerations 
manifested in the aircraft’s Operating and Support (O&S) costs (Ryan, Jacques, Ritschel, 
& Schubert, 2013). Likewise, there is an abundance of research focused on acquisition 
and research and development costs while minimal research specifically focused on O&S 
costs (Jones, White, Ritschel & Ryan, 2015). The U.S. Air Force and the entirety of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) historically emphasized acquisition costs while 
overlooking O&S costs within the Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) leading to years of unadjusted 
cost estimates, which can ultimately lead to future cost growths. However, more recently, 
the U.S. Air Force has emphasized the importance of accurate O&S cost estimates for its 
various fleet of weapon systems to determine a more accurate LCC (Congress, 2009). 
LCC is defined as the sum of four major cost categories: research and development, 
acquisition, O&S, and disposal costs (OSD-CAPE, 2014). O&S costs consists of 
sustainment costs incurred from the initial system deployment through the end of system 
operations (OSD-CAPE, 2014).  
10 
O&S costs, despite being within 50%-65% (dependent on type of fixed-wing 
aircraft) of an aircraft’s LCC, simply did not historically generate the attention it truly 
deserved (Jones, 2015). The Nunn-McCurdy Act, signed into law by President Reagan 
with the 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act (DoDAA), requires “DoD to 
report to Congress whenever a major defense acquisition program experiences cost 
overruns that exceed certain thresholds” (Schwartz, 2010). However, the Nunn-McCurdy 
act only applies to a program during the acquisition and production phase of the life-
cycle. Though many analysts have praised the efforts of the act, others suggest “that 
Nunn-McCurdy is not a sufficiently comprehensive reporting mechanism because it does 
not apply to all elements of a weapon system’s life-cycle costs, such as its operations, 
support, or disposal costs” (Schwartz, 2010). The United States House of Representatives 
have noted the weaknesses of the Nunn-McCurdy and amended it a number of times, 
however these amendments did not address the issues concerning O&S costs.  
The most notable legislation change applicable to O&S costs is the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, commonly known as WSARA, an act that 
reformed the acquisition process within the Do D. WSARA highlighted the importance of 
accurate information and realistic estimates for DoD programs (Public Law, WSARA 
2009). Additionally, WSARA created the office of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (OSD-CAPE) whose primary purpose is to evaluate and assess the accuracy 
and affordability of cost estimates for DoD programs. The Director of OSD-CAPE is 
“appointed by the President and is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense” 
(Public Law, 2009). In recent years, the “DoD mandated that each military service 
maintain an historical database of actual O&S costs for its systems” which has equipped 
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the service member with the ability to research and analyze the O&S cost for weapon 
systems (Public Law, 2009).  
Though WSARA is less than a decade old, the emphasis on accurate estimation 
has disseminated down to the program offices across the Air Force and to the Air Force 
Institute of Technology Cost Analysis Program. The Air Force Institute of Technology 
Cost Analysis Program is an organization that has been on the forefront of cost analysis 
research. The desire to find better techniques and more accurate methods in developing 
O&S estimates has been annotated by many Air Force officers that have participated in 
the research into O&S cost estimates and its numerous avenues of interpretation (Jones, 
2015; Ryan, 2013). The primary focus of this thesis is the research into O&S cost 
estimating relationships (CER) and cost estimating techniques to derive more accurate 
estimates within the OSD-CAPE’s cost element structure (CES). 
Purpose 
This research provides a better understanding of cost relationships within the Air 
Force aircrafts fleet to better predict the accuracy of future O&S costs. We utilize the 
OSD-CAPE’s cost element structure which is composed of six major elements: Unit 
Level Manpower, Unit Operations, Maintenance, Sustaining Support, Continuing System 
Improvements, and Indirect Support (OSD-CAPE, 2014). However, these six elements 
are broken down into various sub-elements (See Figure 1). Extensive research into the 
actual costs incurred within these sub-elements are lacking despite the potential benefits 
they could provide in furthering the accuracy of future O&S estimates.  The data 
available on the cost element structure is found in the Air Force Total Ownership Cost 
12 
(AFTOC) system, which is the Air Force’s specific component within the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC) system. This research is broken 
down into three distinct sections. First, is to characterize the O&S data within the OSD-
CAPE Cost Element Structure (CES) through descriptive statistics for USAF aircraft 
platforms. The second part is to compare and contrasts the categories (bomber, fighter, 
reconnaissance, special duty, trainer, transport/tanker and UAV/drone) within the cost 
element structure through statistical testing to better capture the relationships within the 
aircraft fleet. Third, is to identify cost drivers and cost estimating relationships within the 
cost element structure.  
 
 
Figure 1: Cost Element Structure elements & sub-elements (OSD-CAPE, 2014) 
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Research Questions 
What are the expected mean/median/quartile ranges of the various aircrafts per 
the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure and their relationship to O&S costs?  Determine 
the O&S cost element structure mean/median/quartile ranges for various aircrafts across 
platforms and categories to determine where within the CES the expenditures are 
incurred. Having a better understanding of where within the CES the costs are incurred, 
the decision makers will have statistical evidence to help make better and more 
applicable cost related decisions. The DoD acquisitions community and cost estimators 
alike will both benefit from understanding how our weapon systems are actually 
incurring costs. 
Compare, contrast, and identify the relationships within the OSD-CAPE Cost 
Element Structure across the aircraft categories (bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, 
special duty, trainer, transport/tanker and UAV/drone). By evaluating the relationships 
between aircraft categories, future cost estimators receive a better understanding of the 
relationships that compose the entirety of the Air Force aircraft fleet. This provides a 
source for different program offices to compare and contrast their results with other 
program offices across the Air Force.  
 What are the potential cost drivers and cost estimating relationships within the 
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure? The research intends to find potential cost drivers 
(i.e. cost estimating relationships) in the O&S data. Within the six major cost elements, 
sub-elements exist and their cost could be derived using other elements/sub-elements as 
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factors. We intend to identify these relationships within this research. Therefore, a 
quantitative understanding into the techniques and cost estimating methodology for this 
method will be researched, analyzed, and properly documented to provide future 
estimators a source for utilizing such techniques.  
Methodology 
The AFTOC database is utilized for this research. The database presents data 
broken down into the six OSD-CAPE’s elements and sub-elements. We focus on fixed-
wing aircrafts with available data provided within AFTOC. AFTOC allows the extraction 
of normalized data from 1996-2016 of all categories and platforms presented in this 
research broken down by the six elements (level one) along with their unique sub-
elements (level two and level three). This enables us to capture the descriptive statistics 
needed to answer research question one for each aircraft platform and category.  The 
second research question is achieved by utilizing statistical tests to compare the results of 
question one to develop a better understanding of the relationships between aircraft 
categories. The statistical test utilized to accomplish this is the Kruskal-Wallis test along 
with the Steel-Dwass test which is used to compare differences between two or more 
independent groups. Lastly, question three’s cost drivers are identified using a correlation 
matrix using all elements and sub-elements as the independent variables.   
Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this research is limited to aircraft within the Air Force inventory 
present in the AFTOC system. The data utilized has a start date of 1996 as this was when 
the VAMOSC system originated. The data spans from 1996-2016 due to the data being 
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actuals of how much was spent rather than estimates of how much was planned on 
spending.  As a result, 2017 data is not included. With any service-wide database, 
AFTOC contains flaws due to human error and error based on consistency. The data 
presented in AFTOC is limited to the information provided by various program offices, 
however, AFTOC has normalized the data to limit the errors that can occur from different 
sources of input.   
Though the data utilized is only USAF, the findings may be applicable to other 
services with similar platforms. Further research would be needed to compare and 
contrast similar platforms within different services however the information presented in 
this research will be without this type of exploration. Other limitations would be derived 
from incorrect data points and inconsistencies though we recognize that AFTOC updates 
the database regularly.  
Summary 
This research paper is broken down into five unique chapters: Introduction, 
Literature Review, Methodology, Results and Conclusion. The Literature Review 
contains information on past research that creates the foundation for this thesis. This 
chapter is integral in understanding why this research is being conducted and identifies 
the gap in the literature this thesis will fill.  The Methodology section is a detailed section 
about the statistical techniques utilized to accomplish the goals of this research. In this 
section, you will find a step by step process to understand how the research was 
conducted. The Results section will specifically be a summary of the findings of the tests 
16 
performed. Lastly, the conclusion will discuss the significance of the findings with 
respect to our research questions.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
              This Chapter offers insight into past research focused on Operating and Support 
Costs (O&S) for Department of Defense (DoD) Weapon Systems. It also provides 
background into the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure (CES) and the foundation to 
which this thesis builds upon. Additional information on terminology and definitions for 
the life-cycle cost structure components are essential to provide the background needed to 
understand the purpose and goal of this thesis research. 
Nunn-McCurdy Act & Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
 The Nunn-McCurdy Act was established in 1983 and signed into law by President 
Reagan. The act required DoD officials to report cost overruns to Congress on Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) that exceed certain thresholds (Schwartz, 2010). 
The primary purpose of the Nunn-McCurdy Act was to hold Pentagon officials and defense 
contractors accountable and responsible for managing cost overruns for acquisition 
programs across the DoD during the procurement and acquisition process (Schwartz, 
2010). Moshe Schwartz of the Congressional Research Service investigated the 
effectiveness and shortfalls of the Nunn-McCurdy act nearly three decades after its 
implementation. Schwartz states that the “GAO reported that 42% of programs in the 
FY2008 portfolio experienced acquisition unit cost growth of at least 25% compared to 
37% of programs experiencing cost growth in the FY2000 portfolio” (Schwartz, 2010). Dr. 
Jonathan D. Ritschel of the Air Force Institute of Technology found that Nunn-McCurdy 
breaches rarely resulted in enforcement of the termination threat when breaches occur.  
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Rather, secondary effects, in the form of program restructuring were found to be prevalent, 
but not in those areas that most adversely affected the program (Ritschel, 2012).  Though 
the Nunn-McCurdy Act has proved sufficient for reporting cost overruns during the 
acquisition process, analysts have suggested that it is not a comprehensive reporting tool 
because it does not apply to all phases of the life-cycle process such as O&S costs 
(Schwartz, 2010). One of the main findings of Schwartz’s research is that DoD acquisition 
programs make key decisions during the acquisition phase to lower acquisition costs which 
could result in higher long-term O&S costs – ultimately leading to higher overall life-cycle 
costs (Schwartz, 2010).  
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA 2009) is the most 
current congressional act that reemphasizes the importance of cost estimating and program 
evaluation across the DoD and the first act that put a significant focus on long term O&S 
costs. WSARA established the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (OSD-CAPE) whose director became the principal advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense for independent analysis and matters regarding long-term 
affordability of DoD acquisition programs (Public Law, WSARA 2009). OSD-CAPE was 
established to further strengthen the oversight on DoD acquisition programs after the 
acquisition phase of the life-cycle (Schwartz, 2010). The Public Law document published 
on 22 May 2009 details the functions of WSARA, which is relevant in this research for its 
emphasis on affordability after the acquisition phase and into the O&S phase. It 
complements the Nunn-McCurdy legislation by continuing the tracking of costs during the 
O&S phase and enabling the investigation on such programs that continue to exceed 
thresholds past the acquisition phase.  
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The importance of O&S cost and cost estimates has trickled down to various centers 
across the DoD and the Air Force specifically. The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency 
(AFCAA) at Andrews AFB established an O&S cost division in 2011 while the Air Force 
Space Command established an O&S cost section in 2015. AFCAA is currently in the 
process of developing an O&S specific guide to cost estimating while also establishing 
other guides such as Legacy Aircraft Operations & Support Cost Estimating Guide which 
is a “how-to” document offering guidance for developing cost estimates for legacy aircraft 
systems. The increased emphasis on operations and support in academia, DoD, and 
government supportive agency’s alike is a result after the introduction of WSARA in 2009.  
Definition of Life-Cycle Costs and Operating & Support Costs  
First, we define the cost categories that make up Life-Cycle Costs. According to 
OSD-CAPE’s Cost Estimating Guide, “Life-cycle costs is defined as the sum of four major 
categories: (1) research and development costs; (2) investment costs, consisting of 
procurement, military  construction, and acquisition-related operations and maintenance 
(O&M) associated with production and deployment activities; (3) O&S costs; and (4) 
disposal costs” (OSD CAPE, 2014).   Historically, O&S costs has been the largest cost 
component followed by R&D and investment costs, while, disposal costs have been fairly 
minute in regards to overall system life-cycle costs. Figure 2 illustrates this notional 
relationship between the cost components of life-cycle costs. 
20 
 
Figure 2: OSD-CAPE Cost Estimating Guide: Illustrative System Life Cycle 
This research specifically analyzes O&S costs, the third cost component for a 
systems life-cycle. The 2014 Cost Estimating Guide describes O&S costs as: 
“Consists of sustainment costs incurred from the initial system deployment 
through the end of system operations. Includes all costs of operating, 
maintaining, and supporting a fielded system. Specifically, this consists of 
the costs (organic and contractor) of personnel, equipment, supplies, 
software, and services associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, 
supplying, and otherwise supporting a system in the DoD inventory” (OSD 
CAPE, 2014). 
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The majority of O&S funding is primarily funded by Military Personnel (MILPERS) and 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations (OSD CAPE, 2014). O&M 
appropriations (3400) are one-year appropriations meaning they must be obligated within 
the fiscal year issued, however then can be incrementally funded. The Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) provides examples of what type of expense is funded through O&M 
appropriations:  
“Headquarters operations, civilian salaries and awards, travel, fuel, minor 
construction projects of $1M or less, expenses of operational military 
forces, training and education, recruiting, depot maintenance, purchases 
from Defense Working Capital Funds (e.g., spare parts), base operations 
support, and assets with a system unit cost less than the current 
expense/investment threshold ($250K)” (DAU, 2016).  
 
O&S costs being funded specifically with O&M appropriations illustrates why specific 
weapon systems are sometimes over or underutilized. For example, if the price of fuel is 
near its historical highs, certain aircraft will be grounded and utilization rates drop 
compared to when fuel costs are lower. This example of the process of estimating years or 
even decades prior to when it is actually used is a fundamental issue with O&S estimating. 
Additionally, although the majority of O&S funding comes from O&M appropriations, not 
all cost incurred during the O&S phase is specific to O&M. The Operating and Support 
Cost Management Guidebook states that “Project Managers (PMs) must consider five 
appropriation categories when developing requests for program funding: RDT&E, 
Procurement, MILCON, MILPERS, and O&M” (DAU, 2016). This leads to additional 
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levels of complexity when estimating for O&S costs years, even decades, before the cost 
is actually in the budgetary process. Quantitative techniques, inflation calculators, and 
historical trends are utilized to make the most accurate estimate, however, the estimation 
is merely an educated guess. The mass uncertainty in countless variables make O&S 
estimating extremely difficult and will continue to do so until more accurate techniques are 
established.  
 An accurate estimate would enable smoother preparation for the yearly budgetary 
process, however the budgetary process is not the most demanding concern within the O&S 
issue. By developing more accurate estimates, it enables decision makers to establish 
alternatives and to make more informed long-term financial decisions that can impact 
decades of appropriations. Developing less constrained budgetary situations start, on a 
foundational level, from accurate estimating to provide the decision makers the tools to 
make the most informed decisions they possibly can about weapon systems they are 
procuring.  
 Cost Element Structure Definition 
When constructing O&S cost estimates, the Air Force utilizes the OSD-CAPE’s 
cost element structure. It is defined by six overarching elements including various levels 
of sub-elements. According to the OSD-CAPE Cost Estimating Guide the “cost element 
describes and defines the specific elements to be included in the O&S cost estimate in a 
disciplined hierarchy” (OSD CAPE, 2014). This hierarchy is generalized and certain sub-
elements may not apply to specific estimates depending on weapon system type. For 
example, if a sub element such as Training Munitions does not apply to a specific weapon 
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system, that sub-element would be omitted. The following definitions are provided in the 
2014 OSD-CAPE Cost Estimating Guide: 
• 1.0 Unit-Level Manpower. Cost of operators, maintainers, and other 
support manpower assigned to operating units. May include military, 
civilian, and/or contractor manpower. 
• 2.0 Units Operations. Cost of unit operating material (e.g., fuel, and 
training material), unit support services, and unit travel. Excludes material 
for maintenance and repair. 
• 3.0 Maintenance. Cost of all system maintenance other than maintenance 
manpower assigned to operating units. Consists of organic and contractor 
maintenance. 
• 4.0 Sustaining Support. Cost of system support activities that are provided 
by organizations other than the system’s operating units.  
• 5.0 Continuing System Improvements. Cost of system hardware and 
software modifications.  
• 6.0 Indirect Support. Cost of support activities that provide general 
services that lack the visibility of actual support to specific force units or 
systems. Indirect support is generally provided by centrally managed 
activities that provide a wide range of support to multiple systems and 
associated manpower.  
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The OSD-CAPE guide provides a detailed description of each element. It also 
provides a visual example of certain sub-elements one level below the six overarching 
elements (See Figure 3). The sub-elements are composed as a hierarchy with each level 
broken down into another sub-element level. For example, the second element “Unit 
Operations” is broken down into four sub-elements, however, 2.1 “Operating Material” is 
broken down into 2.1.1 “Energy”, 2.1.2 “Training Munitions,” and 2.1.3 “Other 
Operational Material” (OSD CAPE, 2014). This type of hierarchy enables the estimators 
to provide a structural approach to cost estimating that covers the whole range of potential 
O&S costs.  
 
Figure 3: Cost Estimating Guide Cost Element Structure 
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Relevant Research on Operation & Support Cost 
 Previous research into operating and support costs is minimal compared to the 
research into the acquisition costs of DoD weapon systems. Lt Col Ryan states that 
“between 1945 and 2009, there were over 130 separate studies and commissions focused 
on the acquisition of DoD systems…during this same time period, there appears not to be 
a single published study pertaining to how system costs behave during the O&S phase” 
(Ryan, Jacques, Colombi, & Schubert, 2012).  However, other areas of O&S research has 
been traced back to at least 1975 by Marco Fiorello of the Rand Corporation who 
investigated the ratio of O&S costs to life-cycle cost (Ryan, 2015).  Fiorella also published 
Combat Vehicle System Operating and Support Costs: Guidelines for Analysis in 1977 
which discussed the increasing cost of operating DoD combat vehicle systems and 
researched an effective way of decreasing O&S costs during the life-cycle of a weapon 
system (Fiorello, 1977). The research was an analysis into O&S estimating methodologies 
and the development of O&S cost review procedures and guidelines for examining cost 
impacts for maintaining DoD weapon systems (Fiorello, 1977). However, Fiorello 
concluded that the accuracy of long term cost estimating were ill-founded (Fiorello, 1977).  
In their published article Trends in Weapon System Operating and Support Cost 
(1997), the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) explains how the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, concerned about the effect of shrinking 
modernization budgets, requested IDA to examine whether past efforts to reduce O&S 
costs have been effective (Graves, Domin, & Porten, 1997). Their study determined that 
O&S costs reduction efforts have not been successful, where fifty percent of the new 
weapon systems were more expensive to operate than their predecessor platform (Graves 
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et al., 1997). However, Graves and the other authors also state that new weapon systems 
are more complex and have significantly more capability than the weapon systems they are 
replacing. Therefore it is not a technologically equivalent system, which makes direct 
comparisons difficult. Subsequently, DoD leadership believed the additional capability of 
these new weapon systems, which have a higher per unit cost, may have a lower absolute 
total O&S cost in the long run due to the smaller fleet size needed to accomplish the same 
job (Graves et al., 1997).  
 More recent research into O&S costs were investigated by USAF Lt Col Ryan and 
his coauthors Colombi, Jacques, & Schubert. An article published in 2012 titled A 
Proposed Methodology to Characterize the Accuracy of Life Cycle Cost Estimates for DoD 
Programs researched the accuracy of life-cycle cost estimates and how they behave over 
time while also utilizing data to address the deficiencies within the current analytical 
methodology approach to cost estimating (Ryan et al., 2012). The authors state “strategic 
decisions of program worth are often anchored in life cycle cost estimates, which simply 
cannot be validated if the reliability of the largest cost component is unknown” (Ryan et 
al, 2012). The authors continued to state that it “is essential the DoD develop a means of 
assessing the accuracy of its O&S cost estimates” and demonstrate their research utilizing 
a time-series evaluation of over three dozen MDAPS provides insight into the current 
accuracy, or lack thereof, of O&S cost estimates (Ryan et al., 2014).  Ryan et al. then 
provide recommendations for improving these estimates (Ryan et al., 2012).  
 The article titled Characterizing the Accuracy of DoD Operating and Support Cost 
Estimates written by Lt Col Ryan, Jacques, Ritschel, and Schubert investigates the 
fundamental issue that the DoD has limited resources regarding O&S cost estimate 
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accountability and how O&S cost estimates evolve across time (Ryan, Jacques, Ritschel, 
& Schubert, 2013). Lt Col Ryan and the other authors are the first recorded attempt to 
characterize O&S costs, and given the magnitude of dollars at stake within the O&S arena, 
they argue that this type of research is crucial (Ryan et al., 2013). Their research unveils 
foundational estimating discrepancies on Annual Unit O&S Cost (AUC) estimates and life-
cycle cost estimates (LCC) estimates. The authors state that “on average, AUC estimates 
for aviation programs tend to be too low” while LCC estimates developed by the Air Force 
were also systematically low (Ryan et al., 2013).  Figure 4 provides insight into deficiencies 
regarding the accuracy of AUC estimates across time. These findings strengthen their 
argument that there is a fundamental issue regarding the reliability and accuracy of O&S 
costs estimates. They conclude that this fundamental issue needs to be prioritized by the 
DoD, specifically the Air Force, in order to establish confidence and validity when 
establishing budgets or making decisions that can heavily alter future budgets.  
 
Figure 4: Mean AUC Estimate Errors as a Function of Time (Ryan et al., 2013) 
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USAF Capt. Gregory Ferry took a different approach into O&S cost research 
when he investigated cost growth above inflation (CGAI) for raw materials for aircraft 
within the Air Force inventory. The Air Force utilizes different inflation indices to 
calculate O&S cost estimations for future costs; however when these cost are growing 
faster than anticipated it puts even more complexity within the already constrained 
budgetary process. As Ferry states, quoting former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Admiral Mullens, “continually increasing debt is the biggest threat we have to our 
national security” (Ferry, 2013). Ferry concludes that raw materials, after the data was 
evaluated through statistical techniques, is a source of CGAI (Ferry, 2013). These 
findings affect previous estimates that did not take CGAI into account and the additional 
unaccounted cost increase will lead to cost growth over the life cycle of the program. The 
underestimated sustainment costs of the program will lead to increasing budgetary 
requests that will demand more resources from an already shrinking and constrained DoD 
budget. Another significant finding from this research is the inaccuracy of the inflation 
indices utilized by DoD estimators. If these indices are not accurately capturing the 
growth of raw materials, it raises uncertainty in other variables that may also be 
underestimated.  
Adding to the recent research into O&S Costs, USAF Capt. Gary Jones (2014) 
investigates the ratio of O&S costs to life-cycle costs. Jones’s research sought to determine 
the accuracy of the “golden ratio” of 30:70, acquisition to O&S costs. His findings 
determined that the golden ratio lacks foundational accuracy and determined that a single, 
fixed ratio is not appropriate due to the varying nature of DoD weapons system platforms. 
Jones characterizes the O&S data for eight different groups of weapon systems and found 
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staggering means for O&S costs with missiles being the low mean of roughly 8% of life 
cycle cost and the high mean of 72% O&S costs for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to life 
cycle cost (Jones et al, 2015). Additionally, he concludes the difficulty in estimating O&S 
costs derives from the varying nature of life expectancies for DoD weapon systems (Jones 
et al, 2015). He states that “illustrating the variability of life-cycle proportions among 
weapon system categories, … show a more realistic picture of what program analysts and 
portfolio managers can expect in terms of sustainment costs” (Jones et al, 2015). Therefore, 
the addition of varying life expectancies can allow for cost estimators to estimate for the 
various potential life expectancies of DoD weapon systems to better inform the decision 
maker of potential O&S costs for the respective system.  
 There is no doubt that the recent emphasis on O&S costs has led to increased 
research in the area. Table 1 outlines additional research with emphasis in O&S cost since 
the introduction of WSARA in 2009. With growing emphasis comes increased knowledge 
on root causes and fundamental issues into O&S cost estimating. This research adds to the 
growing literature by proving insight into techniques that result in more accurate O&S cost 
estimating.  
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Table 1: Additional Research into Operating and Support Costs 
 
Research into the Cost Element Structure Components  
  The OSD-CAPE Cost Estimating Guide version 2007, 2010, and 2014 provides an 
informative, detailed section on the Cost Element Structure. However, limited analysis into 
the CES and how estimates are derived within the CES exists. Few examples of research 
Publication & Title Year Authors Main Findings
US GAO, DoD Needs Better 
Information and Guidance to More 
Effectively Manage and Reduce 
Operating and Support Costs of 
Major Weapon Systems
2010 US GAO
DoD lacks key information needed to 
effectively manage and reduce O&S costs for 
most of the weapon systems the GAO 
reviewed. 
IDA, WSARA 2009: Joint Strike 
Fighter Root Cause Analysis 2010
Scot Arnold, Ji  Byun, Harley Cloud, 
Alexander Gallo, Matthew Gonwa, Bruce 
Harmon, Prashant Patel, Colin Sull ivan, 
John Hil ler, & Patricia Broson
The findings list three quantifiable reasons 
which lead to Nunn-McCurdy breaches: Errors 
in the Milestone B estimate resulted in a 23 
percent increase, The redesign effort increase 
the PAUC by 26 percent, and changes in the 
buy profile led to a 5 percent increase in the 
PAUC. 
RAND Corporation, Managing U.S. 
Air Force Aircraft Operating and 
Support Costs
2012 Michal Boito, Thomas Light, Patrick Mills, & Laura Baldwin
Fuel costs drove 31% of overall O&S cost 
growth, unit-level personnel costs 30%, 
weapon system sustainment costs 27%, and 
modifications and other 12%.
US GAO, Improvements Needed to 
Enhance Oversight of Estimated 
Long- term Costs for Operating and 
Supporting Major Weapon Systems. 
Study
2012 US GAO
DoD reports on weapon system O&S 
estimates to Congress are often inconsistent 
and in some cases unreliable, limiting visibility 
needed for effective oversight of these O&S 
cost estimates.
Australian Government DoD, The 
Impact of Increasing Acquisition 
Costs on the Operation and 
Support Budget for Military 
Equipment
2013 Stephen Harrison
The analysis determined that the O&S costs 
for the various weapon systems examined 
are rising. Additionally, a parametric 
relationship between O&S costs and 
acquisition costs exist enabling more 
accurate O&S estimates during early 
acquisition phase. 
Journal of Cost Analysis and 
Parametric, A Macro-Stochastic 
Model for Improving the Accuracy 
of Department of Defense Life Cycle 
Cost Estimates
2013 Erin Ryan, Christine Schubert Kabban, David Jacques, & Jonathan Ritschel
The authors provide a prognostic cost model 
which provides more accurate life cycle cost 
estimates for various DoD programs.
Naval Postgraduate School, 
Analyzing the Effects of the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act
2014 Austin Banford, Brad Naegle, Edward Powley
The analysis concluded a correlation exists 
between WSARA implementation and 
improved cost and schedule performance.
Journal of Transportation 
Management, Organic or Contract 
Support? Investigating Cost and 
Performance in Aircraft 
Sustainment
2016 Jonathan Ritschel & Tamiko Ritschel
The authors find percentage of Contracted 
Logistics Support (CLS) employed in the 
maintenance strategy to be the primary driver 
in O&S maintenance costs.
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within the CES elements exist and this section is aimed to provide insight into those 
research topics.  
A recent article by the Rand Corporation titled Metrics to Compare Aircraft 
Operating and Support Costs in the Department of Defense researched the effectiveness of 
a consistent definition of aircraft O&S cost per flying hour metric that can be utilized across 
all DoD platforms (Boito, Keating, Wallace, DeBlois, & Blum, 2015). This type of research 
is beneficial to the DoD because it allows for a more standardized method of comparison 
for cost per flying hour of different aircrafts. Specifically, Boito et al. focused on the cost 
element structure and defined which cost components had either a fixed or variable 
relationship to flying hours.  The first five elements are self-explanatory and well defined 
according to the OSD-CAPE CES; however the last element, Indirect Support, is more 
vague and susceptible to individual interpretation. Boito describes Indirect Support as 
“costs that are those installation and personnel support costs that cannot be identified 
directly (in the budget or FYDP) to the units and personnel that operate and support the 
system being analyzed, but nevertheless can be logically attributed to the system and its 
associated manpower” (Boito et al., 2015). The importance of sharing Boito’s insight into 
the indirect support element is that it is more subjective than the other elements, meaning 
what one program office determines indirect support may not be applicable to another 
program. Thus, the importance of clear definitions and proper documentations is essential 
in creating estimates within the CES. Additionally, the applicability of Boito’s article to 
this research is the attempt to characterize cost data utilizing the CES. The information 
defining the CES is straight forward and provided by various sources (GAO, OSD CAPE, 
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DoD etc.) however research into the cost estimating techniques when deriving the actual 
O&S cost estimates is lacking.  
Aside from the definitional information provided in the GAO Cost Estimating & 
Assessment Guide and the OSD-CAPE Cost Estimating Guide, the research into the usage 
of the Cost Element Structure in cost estimating is lacking. The research by Boito et al. 
advanced knowledge into the characterization of the Cost Element Structure elements and 
sub-elements however more research is needed to analytically derive cost drivers within 
the CES and statistically determine which platforms are driving up the O&S costs within 
the Air Force.   
Developing Cost Estimates 
 The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and the OSD-CAPE’s Cost 
Estimating Guide thoroughly discusses the development of an O&S cost estimate. They 
individually highlight on a macro perspective the importance of accurate definitions, 
scope, and a step-by-step coverage of what is essential within the O&S estimating 
process. The cost estimating guide also provides detailed definitions of the five primary 
estimating methods that are utilized in creating O&S cost estimates:  
• Parametric. The parametric technique uses regression or other statistical methods 
to develop Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs). A CER is an equation or 
algorithm used to estimate a given cost element using an established relationship 
with one or more independent variables. The relationship may be mathematically 
simple or it may involve a complex equation (often derived from regression 
analysis of historical systems or subsystems). CERs should be current, applicable 
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to the system or subsystem in question, and appropriate for the range of data 
being considered. 
• Analogy. An analogy is a technique used to estimate a cost based on historical 
data for one (or occasionally two) analogous system(s). In this technique, a 
currently fielded system, similar in design and operation to the proposed system, 
is used as a basis for the analogy. The cost of the proposed system is then 
estimated by adjusting the historical cost of the current system to account for 
differences (between the proposed and current systems). Such adjustments can be 
made through the use of factors (sometimes called scaling parameters) that 
represent differences in size, performance, technology, reliability and 
maintainability, complexity, or other attributes. Adjustment factors based on 
quantitative data are usually preferable to adjustment factors based on judgments 
from subject-matter experts. 
• Engineering Estimate. This technique uses discrete estimates of labor and 
material costs for maintenance and other support functions. The system being 
estimated normally is broken down into lower-level subsystems and components, 
each of which is estimated separately. The component costs, with additional 
factors for integration, are then aggregated using simple algebraic equations to 
estimate the cost of the entire system (hence the common name “bottom-up” 
estimate). For example, system maintenance costs could be calculated for each 
system component using data inputs such as system operating tempo, component 
mean time between maintenance action, component mean labor hours to repair, 
and component mean material cost per repair. Engineering estimates require 
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extensive knowledge of a system’s (and its components’) characteristics and a 
significant amount of detailed data (sometimes obtained from the system prime 
contractor). These methods are normally employed for mature programs. 
• Extrapolation of Actual Costs. With this technique, actual cost experience or 
trends (from prototypes, engineering development models, and/or early 
production items) are used to project future costs for the same system. Such 
projections may be made at various levels of detail, depending on the availability 
of data. Such projections also may need to account for growth in reliability and 
maintainability. 
• Cost Factors. Cost factors are applicable to certain cost elements not related to 
weapon system characteristics. Often, cost factors are simple per capita factors 
that are applied to direct (i.e., unit-level) manpower to estimate indirect cost 
elements such as base operations, military medical care, or general training and 
education (not associated with a specific weapon system). 
 
As shown above, while the current estimating guides are useful for understanding the 
proper procedures and the textbook cost estimating methods of developing an estimate, 
they lack a practical approach to real time estimating. The explanation on the process, the 
strengths or weaknesses of the primary approaches, and a detailed definition for each 
method is present but it lacks a standardize process for real time estimating that could be 
utilized across program offices throughout the Air Force.  
 Currently, the Air Force doesn’t proscribe a standardized method of estimating. It 
is largely dependent on which program office, center or organization is completing the 
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cost estimate. This is primarily to ensure a broad scope in estimating to ensure the 
accuracy of each estimate. The Air Force has four primary types of cost estimates: 
Program Office Estimates (POEs), Non Advocate Cost Assessments (NACAs), Service 
Cost Positions (SCPs) and Independent Cost Estimates (ICEs) (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary, 2017). POEs are specific to the program office that will be supporting the 
project, NACAs are created by an organization that does not directly support the project 
and acts merely as a cross-check third party member.  The reconciled POE and 
independent estimate becomes the official Air Force cost estimate called the SCP 
estimate. An ICE, similar to a NACA, is a product of OSD-CAPE when required by 
statute for ACAT ID and IAM programs according to DoDI 5000.02 (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary, 2017). All these estimates differ in methodology and process to 
ensure the Air Force broadly covers every avenue in the estimating process.  
Though there is not a standardize method into O&S cost estimating, one reason 
could be due to the uniqueness of each cost estimate. Primarily O&S estimating 
methodologies differ when estimating for an existing weapon system from a new weapon 
system in the acquisition phase. Also, estimates are independent of each other from a 
macro perspective regarding which type of weapon system is being estimated. For 
example, the methodology and approach of estimating a fixed wing aircraft compared to 
a satellite differs tremendously therefore it is understandable that Air Force Space 
Command follows a different approach compared to Air Force Life Cycle Management 
Center at Wright Patterson AFB. Additionally, estimating intent and methods also differ 
in a micro perspective within the acquisition phase alone. For example, Figure 5 portrays 
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how the intent of an estimate and the role it plays within different stages in the 
acquisition process.  
 
Figure 5: Role of O&S Estimates by Acquisition Event (OSD CAPE, 2014). 
The intricate details that come along with O&S estimates is what makes them 
difficult. To truly establish a detailed instruction guide to creating O&S estimates would 
be beneficial but due to the subjective nature of some estimates it may serve only as a 
reference tool to developing O&S estimates.  
Summary 
 The intent of this Chapter was to inform on the past research that focused on 
Operating and Support (O&S) Cost for Department of Defense Weapon Systems. The 
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importance of accurate O&S cost estimates were emphasized after the introduction of 
WSARA in 2009 and the abundance of research to follow serves as evidence that 
Congress, the DoD and academia has taken interest in long-term sustainment cost of our 
major weapon systems. This Chapter also gave detailed information on the development 
of O&S cost estimates and the foundation to developing these estimates within the OSD 
CAPE Cost Element Structure. Also, the limited research into the characterization of 
O&S data within the cost element structure is displayed in the Chapter due to the minimal 
content regarding the subject. Additionally, the information on terminology and 
definitions that encompass O&S estimates are essential to provide the background needed 
to understand the purpose and goal of this thesis research. The next chapter follows the 
methodology of how the data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted.  
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 3 is a detailed methodology focusing on the process of collecting data, 
utilizing statistical tools, and interpreting the outputs of the statistical test performed in 
the analysis of the data. First, we explain the research design followed by the research 
questions to inform why the following test were needed. Next, we describe the data 
collection process and the assumptions needed to conduct the research.  
Research Design 
The aircraft O&S data is from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) 
system while being arranged in the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure. AFTOC allows 
for the extraction of actual O&S cost data ranging from 1996-2016 for the total aircraft 
inventory. The data enables us to complete statistical tests and provide descriptive 
statistics needed to characterize the O&S data for the various aircrafts. The data is 
integral in allowing us to answer the three research questions that are present in this 
thesis. Various tests and statistical tools (JMP Statistical Software & Microsoft Excel) are 
used to characterize this data. The data derived from AFTOC is raw and needs 
standardization and normalization to complete the statistical tests.  
Table 2 portrays the screening methodology to derive aircraft platforms and 
categories that are examined during this research which is portrayed in Table 3. Each 
aircraft platform researched is an ACAT 1 program. AFTOC distinguished aircrafts by 
Mission Design (MD) and Mission Design Series (MDS). For example, the F-16’s MD is 
F-16 while an example of the MDS is the F-16A. To develop a dataset of actual costs that 
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can be characterized and statistically tested, we cleanse the data based on multiple 
factors. First, we omit aircrafts that have less than 10 aircrafts in their total average 
inventory for the years 1996-2016 decreasing the total MDS from the original of 274 to 
146.  This removes the platforms that are experimental and not mass produced. Second, 
this research investigated only fixed-wing aircrafts and omitted gliders, helicopters, and 
ground unit vehicles decreasing the MDS count by 26 equaling 120 MDS. Next, real time 
estimators normally conduct their estimates on a cost per flying hour (CPFH) basis, 
therefore we screen the data to exclude programs that are not incurring flying hours 
greater than 100 hours per year during the timeframe examined. This step brought down 
the MDS count from 120 to 90. However, we keep the platforms that are being phased-in 
and phased-out. Lastly, we screened the data based on years of available cost data.  
Platforms that were being phased-out with less than 10 years of cost data are omitted 
while platforms being phased-in with less than five years of cost data are omitted to 
ensure cost expenditures are stable. The last step in the cleansing decreased the total 
MDS from 90 to 52 total MDS.  
 
Table 2: Screening Process for Aircrafts 
 
Screen Remaining MDS
AFTOC 274
MDS TAI > 10 146
MD = Fixed Wing Aircraft 126
Flying Hours > 100 90
Phasing Out > 10 Years/ Phasing In > 5 Years 52
Total Aircrafts Examined 52
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The database from AFTOC provides the cost elements down to various different 
levels (second level, third level, fourth level etc.). However, for the purpose of this 
research we examine the cost elements down to the third level because it is typically the 
lowest level practitioner cost estimators utilize. Therefore, if the database presents cost at 
the fourth or fifth level we sum up the cost data to equal the third level. For example, the 
database has individual cost for 2.1.1.1 (AV Fuel), 2.1.1.2 (POL), and 2.1.1.3 
(Electricity) that is accumulated to 2.1.1 (Energy) (according to the CAPE 2014 Cost 
Element Matrix on AFTOC). However, some cost is only presented at the second level, 
therefore, we are unable conduct analysis at the third element for these costs.  
 
Table 3: Categories and Platforms Analyzed 
 
41 
Cost per Flying Hour 
Once the database is established, in order to normalize the O&S cost, we calculate 
the cost per flying hour (CPFH) for each aircraft. CPFH is calculated by taking the annual 
cost for a certain element and dividing it by the flying hours for that certain platform for 
that respective year. This enables us to determine the cost per flying hour for each 
specific element. A benefit of calculating the CPFH is it normalizes the data regardless of 
years in which platforms were more utilized than other years.  
Next, we calculate the percentages for each cost element to the encompassing cost 
element. For example, we divide the cost of 1.1 (Operations), 1.2 (Unit-Level 
Maintenance), and 1.3 (Other Unit – Level) by the total expenditures for 1.0 (Unit-Level 
Manpower) to derive the percentages per element 1.0 Unit-Level Manpower. This same 
methodology is utilized for deriving the cost percentages for the six overarching elements 
per total expenditures for that platform per year. Calculating CPFH, regardless of ramp-
up or ramp-down, demilitarization, changes in operations tempo, or attrition, is a good 
indicator of how the O&S costs behave within the cost element. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃 =
𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶 
 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶
 
 
Prior to calculating the CPFH, it is necessary to normalize costs for inflation. The 
Air Force recommends the usage of DoD inflation tables that are issued by the Secretary 
of the Air Force Office of Financial Management (SAF/FM) and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). The O&S actual costs presented in AFTOC are 
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provided in base-year (BY) and then-year (TY) dollars. The specific database retrieved 
from AFTOC is normalized to BY 2016 therefore inflation is already accounted for. This 
means, all cost regardless of respective year, is in base year (BY) for 2016.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
What are the expected mean/median/quartile ranges of various aircrafts and their 
relationship to O&S costs?  This is the primary goal of this thesis research. Despite 
increased research into O&S costs, the characterization of the cost data varying between 
platforms has yet to be examined. The output will portray which cost elements are 
costlier for specific platforms and where within the OSD-CAPE CES the cost is incurred. 
For example, the mean/median/quartile ranges will be calculated down to element 1.2.1 
(Organizational Maintenance) which is a sub element of element 1.2 (Unit Level 
Maintenance) under the overarching element 1.0 (Unit Level Manpower). The descriptive 
statistics will be broken down by individual platform but also at the category level.   
Descriptive Statistics 
The formula for mean, which is the average of the variables being collected, used 
in this research is the general sum of all variables, ∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 divided by the total number of 
variables that are used for the calculation, 𝐹𝐹.  
𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 =
∑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹
 
After calculating the mean, the median cost is calculated to determine the middle 
cost of the data set. The median is calculated by ordering the costs in chronological order 
from least to greatest, then determining which cost lies directly in the middle. The median 
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is not exclusively one number at times. When there is an even number of variables in a 
set, the median would then be two different, or the same, numbers.  
𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 =  {(𝐹𝐹 + 1) ÷ 2}𝐶𝐶ℎ 
Next, we determine the interquartile ranges (IQR) within the data set. The 
importance of calculating the IQR is to determine the middle 50% of the data while 
determining the upper (Q3) and lower (Q1) quartiles to determine the spread of the data 
set. This will measure the variability within our data. The calculation of 
mean/median/quartile ranges for the data set will help with the overall description of the 
data set. The combination of all three helps determine if the mean is representative of the 
data, or if not, then the spread of all the costs is too large and this indicates large 
differences within the cost data set.  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =  𝐼𝐼3 − 𝐼𝐼1 
Compare, contrast, and identify the relationships within the OSD-CAPE Cost 
Element Structure across the aircraft categories (bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, 
special duty, trainer, transport/tanker and UAV/drone). This will determine the 
relationship between the different aircraft categories in relationship to the OSD-CAPE 
CES. Provided this information, it helps the decision makers make conscious decisions 
regarding the yearly budget and how to best plan for substantial increases/decreases 
within the O&S portion of the budgetary process. To ensure that the data is representative 
of the categories, we omitted certain actual costs for various reasons due to the 
assumption that it is not representative of true population trends. Some of these data may 
have logical reasons to why they do not represent the population in which they are 
cohorts. Other data points omitted did not have logical reasons to why they were not 
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representative, therefore the omission of these data points will make the findings more 
credible. For example, the WC-130H incurred zero cost in element 1.0 Unit Level 
Manpower from the years 1996-1998 while incurring the majority of the costs in element 
6.0 Indirect Support. This is not aligned with the population trend and allowing these 
costs to be remain in the data set would drive down the true representative percentage for 
this element. The purpose of this thesis is to educate estimators on the average 
expenditures percentages for these six elements for various platforms and categories and 
omitting certain data points could best serve this intent. The route of omitting these data 
points starts by producing distribution graphs from JPM of each independent element in 
reference to the seven categories. The distribution includes Box-and-Whisker Plots that 
show the median, upper quartile, the lower quartile, the maximum value excluding 
outliers, and the minimum value excluding outliers. The data points outside the maximum 
and minimum values are values that are more than a 1.5 multiplier than the upper or low 
quartile respectfully. These data points do not represent the population and therefore 
skew the descriptive statistics. To ensure accuracy and precision of the results, we omit 
these outliers.  
Statistical Tests 
 First, we check if the data set is normally distributed. The JMP Statistical 
Software program accomplishes this by outputting a distribution for each independent 
category for each respective cost element. If normality is not passed, we treat the data set 
in its entirety as not-normal and utilize non-parametric statistical testing to compare the 
medians between categories.  
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To limit Type I errors, we are utilizing the Bonferroni Correction normally known 
as the Bonferroni Type Adjustment. This is a conservative approach to limiting Type I 
errors. A Type I error is the rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis stating there is a difference between the medians when in truth there is no 
statistical difference between the medians.  By limiting the probability of committing a 
Type I error it adds credibility to the results of the statistical tests that are run in the 
analysis. The Bonferroni correction tests each individual hypothesis at a p-value equal to 
α, which is the desired p value of .05, divided by the number of hypothesis, which in this 
case is 21 individual hypothesis per cost element. Therefore, each individual hypothesis 
will be evaluated at 𝑝𝑝 𝑣𝑣𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃 ≤  ∝
𝑚𝑚
= .05
21
=  .00238.  
 To compare the medians within the data set, we utilize the Kruskal-Wallis and 
Steel Dwaas tests in JMP. The Kruskal-Wallis test is the appropriate test to use when 
comparing two or more groups. It is the non-parametric equivalence to the one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) test utilized when the samples are normally distributed. 
This test is a rank based nonparametric test that can be used to “determine if there are 
statistically significant differences between two or more groups of an independent 
variable on a continuous or ordinal dependent variable” (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The 
same hypothesis test is used for each categorical comparison. If the p-value > 0.00238 we 
fail to reject the null, stating there is no difference between the median ranges of the 
categorical variables. However, if the p-value < 0.00238 we reject the null hypothesis and 
state that at least one median is statically different from the group.   
Kruskal-Wallis Test  
HO:  Δ1X = ΔY 
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Ha: ΔX ≠ ΔY 
The Kruskal-Wallis tests combines all observation for all variables and ranks 
them appropriately. Next H is calculated, which is a ratio of the aggregate measure of 
group differences over the mean of the sampling distribution (Vassar College, 2017). The 
results derive a p-value which is compared to the family-wise error rate (𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒). If the p-
value is rejected, we complete the Steel Dwaas test, which is the completion of multiple 
Mann Whitney tests in JMP, which is a non-parametric test that is used to compare two 
sample, or group, medians that come from the same population (Nachar, 2008). 
Mann-Whitney Test  
𝑈𝑈 = ��𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
The Mann Whitney test derives where within the categories the differences lie 
within the medians. The Mann Whitney test calculates the test statistic, U.  The results of 
the Mann Whitney will be compared to the comparison-wise error rate (𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐). The (𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐) is 
derived by dividing the (𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒) secondary tests in “accordance with statistical theory on 
multiple simultaneous comparisons and error rates known as the Bonferroni Method 
(Nachar, 2008). The 𝐹𝐹 and 𝑚𝑚 represent the two-different samples. Again, if the p-value < 
0.00238, there is a statistical difference between the two different samples being 
compared. The output for the Steel Dwaas test in JMP includes the score mean difference 
as well as the p-value for the pair comparisons of 𝐹𝐹 and 𝑚𝑚. The score difference portrays 
the strength of the difference while the p-value represents the threshold at which the pair 
is either statistically different or statistically the same.  
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What are the potential cost drivers and cost estimating relationships within the 
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure? This investigation is to determine where within the 
cost element structure relationships within cost elements/sub-elements exist. To 
determine if these relationships exist, we create a correlation table with all elements/sub-
elements as independent variables. JMP Software allows for the creation of a correlation 
table to determine if the continuous variables are related to each other through 
multivariate analysis. 
Prediction 
 Taking into account the range of complexity of an aircraft compared to another 
we assume that the mean/median/quartile ranges will vary between platforms, some 
significantly. However, we assume that variances between platforms should align closely 
with each other. Cost drivers are also expected to be unique to the platform/category. For 
example, a fighters cost driver may be totally different than a cargo aircrafts cost driver. 
The range in designated missions led to this assumption. On a macro level, the 
comparison between categories is also expected to result in different characterization of 
data and cost drivers.  
Conclusion 
The data collected is derived from AFTOC. The analysis and tests selected to 
normalize, standardize, and characterize the data reflect one approach.  We recognize that 
other techniques could have been utilized. The decision to normalize to the CPFH is to 
maintain a level of homogeneity and is made after discussion with cost estimators in 
AFLCMC. Chapter Four will contain the results of the analysis. 
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Chapter IV: Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This Chapter is the accumulation of all results of the analysis to portray O&S 
costs characteristics of the various categories and platforms that were examined. 
Descriptive statistics is utilized to show the percentages incurred by the various elements 
in the OSD-CAPE 2014 Cost Element matrix format for various platforms and 
categories. The following chapter will include the three research questions and the 
analysis and results for each question. The first research question aims to characterize 
O&S cost for the seven categories and various platforms. The second research question 
utilizes statistical tools and statistical testing to derive if a difference exists between the 
different categories in relationship to the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure. The third 
research question focuses on using a correlation matrix including all the cost 
elements/sub-elements to derive which elements are correlated and if relationships exist.  
Research Question I 
What are the expected mean/median/quartile ranges of various aircrafts and their 
relationship to O&S costs?  The first set of results is portrayed in Table 4. It depicts the 
mean percentages, median, and quartile ranges for the entirety of the aircrafts examined 
in this analysis. All the tests are performed and examined in Microsoft Excel and JMP 
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Statistical Software. The final dataset is comprised of 52 aircraft platforms and 916 rows 
of aircraft data.  The first results to note is that the first three elements 1.0 Unit-Level 
Manpower, 2.0 Unit Operations, and 3.0 Maintenance accumulated the largest percentage 
of the mean for the aircraft costs over the years of 1996-2016 consuming 82.38% of total 
expenditures for the 52 aircraft.  
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the 52 Aircrafts Analyzed 
 
Tables 5-10 portray the percentages for the six OSD-CAPE cost elements for the 
seven aircraft categories that were examined. The categories cumulative cost for the first 
three elements are as follows: Bomber - 76.98%, Fighters – 87.42%, Reconnaissance – 
86.49%, Special Duty – 82.18%, Trainer 64.62%, Transports – 84.73%, and UAV/Drone 
– 83.27%. Due to the first three elements consuming the majority of the expenditures, the 
discussion is heavily focuses on the descriptive statistics of these three elements. 
 
Table 5: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Bombers 
 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
1.0 Unit Level Manpower 31.46% 13.02% 31.97% 17.88%
2.0 Unit Operations 19.58% 8.28% 18.25% 9.29%
3.0 Maintenance 31.35% 12.10% 30.31% 14.59%
4.0 Sustaining Support 1.94% 2.80% 1.31% 1.87%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 9.05% 8.78% 6.60% 9.35%
6.0 Indirect Support 6.62% 7.96% 4.28% 4.34%
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Table 6: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Fighters 
 
Table 7: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Reconnaissance 
 
 
Table 8: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Special Duty 
 
Table 9: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Trainer 
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Table 10: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Transport 
 
 
Table 11: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for UAV/Drone 
 
A trend to note is the increased cost in 3.0 Maintenance when the platform is 
being maintained by Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) rather than organically 
maintained by Air Force “Blue Suiters.” Platforms can be maintained in three different 
ways: Organically, CLS, or a combination of both. When cost is being consumed by sub-
element 3.7 Contractor Logistic Support, it is an indicator that the platform is either 
maintained by both organic/contracted means or fully contracted out to the third party. 
These findings align with the findings of Col. (Ret.) Jonathan D. Ritschel and Tamiko L. 
Ritschel in their analysis portrayed in the published work Organic or Contract Support? 
Investigating Cost and Performance in Aircraft Sustainment. The results of their analysis 
not only reveal that a difference in cost exist between the three maintenance sources but 
also that CLS is correlated as the most significant factor in aircraft maintenance cost 
(Ritschel & Ritschel, 2016).  
 From the results, an indicator that a platform is being modernized or introduced to 
the Air Force aircraft fleet is when cost element 5.0 Continuing System Improvements is 
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incurring more cost than the category mean percentage for that element. An assumption is 
that these platforms are continually being upgraded/modernized and are equipped with 
more advanced hardware and more intricate software.   
 
Bombers 
Table 12: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Bombers 
 
 
The bombers category is represented by the B-52H, B-1B, and the B-2A. The 
Cost Elements 1.0 Unit-Level Manpower, 2.0 Unit Operations, and 3.0 Maintenance 
accumulate 76.98% of all O&S cost from the years 1996-2016 for the bombers category. 
Table 13 shows that of the three platforms, the B-52H is the only platform to fall outside 
+/- 1SD from the mean for all bombers in element 1.0. The B-52H is the primary driver 
for the mean percentages for elements 1.0 and 2.0. From the data, it appears that the older 
the aircraft the more cost it consumes in the top two elements.  Additionally, for element 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 25.85% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.05%
1.1 Operations 20.18% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.75%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 62.02% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 9.50%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 17.79% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.06%
2 Unit Operations 15.17% 4 Sustaining Support 4.96%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 66.15% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 3.26%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 4.48% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 84.87%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.35% 4.4 Program Management 0.35%
2.2 Support Services 20.28% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 7.76%
2.3 TDY 2.41% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 1.42%
2.4 Transportaion 1.33% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.34%
3 Maintenance 35.95% 5 Continuing System Improvements 16.06%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 8.06% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 46.54%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 39.10% 5.2 Software Maintenance 53.46%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.11% 6 Indirect Support 2.01%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 34.54% 6.1 Installation Support 78.10%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.95%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.66% 6.3 General Training & Education 16.95%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.18%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
Bomber
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5.0, Continuing System Improvements, the B-52H significantly impacts the mean 
percentage and drives it down. It has a mean of 8.62% while category mean is nearly 
double that at 16.02%. If the B-52H was omitted the mean percentage would increase to 
19.78%. The B-1B is nearly aligned with the category average at 16.88% while the B-2A 
surpassed the average within one standard deviations away at 22.68%. These results are 
not surprising due to the increased technological capabilities that are integrated into these 
two platforms. Also, newer planes are assumed to have increased software maintenance 
and hardware maintenance due to more integrated systems that are continually being 
upgraded. These B-1B and B-2A each reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 1986 
and 1993 respectfully while the first version of the B-52 was introduced into the 
operational Air Force in 1954. The B-2A recorded the lowest mean for each of the top 
three categories with a mean of 22.12% for Unit-level Manpower (category mean of 
25.85%), 11.09% for Unit Operations (category mean of 15.17%), and 34.02% for 
Maintenance (category mean of 35.95%). 
Table 13: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements for Bomber 
  
  
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 25.85% 5.81% 24.46% 9.04%
B-1B 22.84% 3.34% 22.80% 5.92%
B-2A 22.13% 3.20% 22.23% 2.92%
B-52H 32.59% 3.37% 32.87% 4.87%
1.0 Unit Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 15.17% 4.78% 15.14% 8.27%
B-1B 16.95% 4.60% 15.41% 7.61%
B-2A 11.09% 3.79% 9.87% 5.26%
B-52H 17.46% 3.01% 18.06% 4.53%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 35.95% 7.39% 35.02% 6.67%
B-1B 38.07% 5.32% 36.25% 7.77%
B-2A 34.02% 10.99% 34.84% 12.55%
B-52H 35.76% 3.41% 34.53% 6.19%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 4.96% 4.61% 3.81% 2.69%
B-1B 3.91% 1.77% 3.10% 2.33%
B-2A 7.74% 7.05% 5.58% 4.41%
B-52H 3.23% 0.82% 3.20% 1.44%
4.0 Sustaining Support
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Fighter 
Table 14: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Fighter 
 
 As previously discussed, elements 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 consumed 87.42% of the total 
expenditures for the Fighter category. The fighter category is represented by 15 weapon 
systems: A-10 (A, OA & C variation), F-15 (A-E variation), F-16 (A-D variation), F-
117A, F-22A, and the F-35A. Of the 15 aircrafts, three platforms are maintained through 
CLS means: F-117A, F-22A, F-35A. These aircrafts are also the most modern aircrafts 
within the fighter categories reaching IOC in 1988, 2003, and 2013. As shown in Table 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 16.06% 8.24% 15.00% 11.97%
B-1B 16.88% 5.13% 17.86% 7.84%
B-2A 22.68% 8.26% 22.03% 10.85%
B-52H 8.62% 3.33% 8.61% 5.54%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Bomber 2.00% 0.80% 1.90% 0.80%
B-1B 1.35% 0.45% 1.20% 0.76%
B-2A 2.33% 0.49% 2.33% 0.77%
B-52H 2.34% 0.93% 1.99% 0.56%
6.0 Indirect Support
1 Unit-Level Manpower 33.78% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.19%
1.1 Operations 13.62% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 66.35% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 17.09%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 20.03% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.68% 4 Sustaining Support 1.57%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 60.78% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 15.18%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 11.52% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 64.38%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.00% 4.4 Program Management 1.61%
2.2 Support Services 13.86% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 8.75%
2.3 TDY 5.80% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 7.55%
2.4 Transportaion 1.02% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.54%
3 Maintenance 35.96% 5 Continuing System Improvements 7.14%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 15.87% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 87.09%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 50.66% 5.2 Software Maintenance 12.91%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.26% 6 Indirect Support 3.86%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 11.60% 6.1 Installation Support 78.58%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.08%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.85% 6.3 General Training & Education 17.35%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.59%
Fighter
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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15, the three each have a maintenance mean percentage of 59.62%, 42.04%, and 37.65 
respectfully while the category mean is 35.96%.  However, only the F-117A exceeds two 
standard deviations, which is 57.16%, from the mean while the other two platforms are 
within one standard deviation.  
 The OA-10A Thunderbolt II, a specific derivative of the A-10’s main design for 
forward air control, nearly exceeds two standardizations for element 1.0 at a mean 
percentage of 49.00%. The minimum for 1.0 for the years examined is higher than any 
other fighter platform mean percentage. The OA-10A was heavily utilized on a flying 
hour basis until it was phased out and no longer incurred any flying hours after 2008. The 
OA-10A began with an inventory of 146 platforms in 1996 and by 2009 zero platforms 
were operational.  
 The newest operational aircrafts in the inventory are the F-22A Raptor and F-35A 
Lightning II which started incurring O&S cost in 2003 and 2012 respectfully. However, 
both exceed one standard deviation away from the mean in 5.0. The mean for the F-22A 
is 14.90% and the F-35A is 15.42% while the fighter category mean is 7.14%. Within 
element 5.0, both platforms consume more in 5.1 (Hardware Modifications) with the F-
22A consuming 99.78% and the F-35A consuming 78.92%. According to the OSD-
CAPE O&S Cost-Estimating Guide 5.1 is “the cost of development, procurement, and 
installation of modifications kits” (OSD CAPE, 2014). It appears that when new fighter 
aircraft are being introduced to the Air Force fleet they are likely to need modifications in 
the early years of their O&S lifecycle phase.  
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Table 15: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements for Fighter 
 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 33.78% 8.79% 33.68% 13.02%
A-10A 37.07% 4.10% 37.32% 5.91%
A-10C 38.36% 5.26% 38.43% 7.77%
F-117A 20.24% 3.45% 18.71% 5.37%
F-15A 33.96% 4.24% 33.31% 7.64%
F-15B 34.84% 5.83% 33.37% 8.10%
F-15C 28.61% 2.27% 28.23% 2.81%
F-15D 26.90% 2.72% 26.14% 3.55%
F-15E 29.55% 3.89% 28.83% 3.92%
F-16A 44.54% 5.29% 44.25% 6.09%
F-16B 35.73% 8.47% 36.82% 11.49%
F-16C 40.67% 2.10% 41.04% 2.93%
F-16D 39.75% 2.53% 39.96% 2.98%
F-22A 20.24% 6.19% 22.11% 9.30%
F-35A 28.55% 5.52% 29.08% 10.74%
OA-10A 49.00% 3.69% 48.69% 5.32%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 17.68% 6.10% 16.95% 6.71%
A-10A 18.26% 3.96% 17.93% 5.31%
A-10C 21.07% 3.05% 22.46% 5.37%
F-117A 10.91% 2.03% 11.17% 3.22%
F-15A 17.23% 4.89% 16.18% 6.97%
F-15B 17.99% 4.97% 16.88% 7.87%
F-15C 15.99% 2.70% 15.54% 4.94%
F-15D 17.04% 2.77% 16.95% 4.36%
F-15E 19.87% 4.20% 20.93% 7.07%
F-16A 16.32% 3.94% 14.83% 7.31%
F-16B 20.70% 4.87% 19.03% 9.53%
F-16C 18.58% 3.41% 19.21% 6.84%
F-16D 19.44% 3.37% 19.51% 6.67%
F-22A 20.23% 18.10% 13.74% 5.31%
F-35A 9.71% 2.15% 10.28% 4.09%
OA-10A 16.11% 2.80% 16.73% 3.44%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 35.96% 10.60% 33.92% 15.86%
A-10A 29.39% 3.04% 29.88% 4.97%
A-10C 26.53% 3.81% 26.84% 6.28%
F-117A 59.62% 1.48% 59.16% 2.67%
F-15A 38.38% 7.39% 41.78% 13.51%
F-15B 36.08% 9.62% 38.09% 9.60%
F-15C 41.84% 2.72% 42.02% 3.59%
F-15D 43.00% 3.52% 43.26% 4.34%
F-15E 40.75% 4.03% 39.96% 7.01%
F-16A 28.29% 6.32% 30.59% 3.73%
F-16B 32.94% 5.63% 32.83% 8.10%
F-16C 27.99% 1.89% 27.61% 3.00%
F-16D 27.69% 2.25% 27.31% 3.73%
F-22A 42.04% 17.66% 45.88% 18.98%
F-35A 37.65% 11.70% 35.83% 21.58%
OA-10A 24.49% 3.04% 23.69% 2.88%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 1.57% 1.08% 1.44% 1.11%
A-10A 1.98% 0.98% 1.79% 1.44%
A-10C 2.28% 0.83% 2.09% 1.05%
F-117A 0.38% 0.18% 0.33% 0.32%
F-15A 2.23% 1.08% 1.73% 1.31%
F-15B 2.34% 1.07% 2.09% 1.74%
F-15C 2.02% 1.14% 1.88% 1.07%
F-15D 1.78% 1.27% 1.56% 0.73%
F-15E 0.97% 1.06% 0.78% 0.94%
F-16A 2.33% 0.63% 2.18% 0.91%
F-16B 2.54% 0.86% 2.52% 1.38%
F-16C 1.42% 0.35% 1.34% 0.47%
F-16D 1.36% 0.33% 1.29% 0.55%
F-22A 0.21% 0.18% 0.12% 0.35%
F-35A 0.96% 0.56% 1.26% 0.88%
OA-10A 0.75% 0.48% 0.60% 0.86%
4.0 Sustaining Support
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Reconnaissance  
Table 16: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for 
Reconnaissance 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 7.14% 5.26% 6.58% 5.99%
A-10A 8.97% 4.98% 7.12% 7.15%
A-10C 7.40% 5.49% 10.30% 10.66%
F-117A 6.48% 4.11% 7.07% 5.93%
F-15A 2.98% 1.99% 2.49% 3.51%
F-15B 3.29% 2.10% 3.10% 3.52%
F-15C 9.00% 4.51% 9.52% 7.49%
F-15D 8.32% 4.60% 7.57% 6.82%
F-15E 6.34% 2.65% 6.26% 2.85%
F-16A 3.52% 3.59% 2.26% 7.10%
F-16B 4.79% 4.40% 3.20% 8.57%
F-16C 6.84% 2.05% 7.34% 2.94%
F-16D 7.56% 2.14% 7.67% 2.37%
F-22A 14.90% 8.21% 13.20% 12.10%
F-35A 15.42% 13.70% 23.01% 26.02%
OA-10A 4.70% 2.82% 3.99% 2.05%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Fighter/Attack 3.86% 1.77% 3.84% 2.47%
A-10A 4.33% 1.59% 4.15% 2.10%
A-10C 4.36% 1.04% 4.48% 1.48%
F-117A 2.36% 1.01% 1.98% 1.90%
F-15A 5.22% 1.54% 5.33% 1.25%
F-15B 5.46% 1.67% 5.67% 1.54%
F-15C 2.54% 0.46% 2.39% 0.93%
F-15D 2.96% 0.81% 2.72% 1.50%
F-15E 2.53% 0.31% 2.53% 0.49%
F-16A 5.00% 2.71% 5.64% 2.40%
F-16B 3.31% 2.09% 3.89% 4.10%
F-16C 4.51% 0.92% 4.26% 1.18%
F-16D 4.20% 0.72% 3.92% 1.00%
F-22A 2.38% 0.53% 2.27% 0.98%
F-35A 7.71% 2.90% 6.72% 4.26%
OA-10A 4.95% 1.63% 4.21% 1.37%
6.0 Indirect Support
1 Unit-Level Manpower 31.83% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.01%
1.1 Operations 36.02% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.03%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 48.60% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 47.43%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.38% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 14.13% 4 Sustaining Support 1.74%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 59.65% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 25.30%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 42.59%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.92% 4.4 Program Management 5.17%
2.2 Support Services 22.42% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 3.04%
2.3 TDY 11.15% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 19.45%
2.4 Transportaion 0.87% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 4.45%
3 Maintenance 40.53% 5 Continuing System Improvements 9.00%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 5.91% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 75.65%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 20.88% 5.2 Software Maintenance 24.35%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.08% 6 Indirect Support 2.77%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 16.89% 6.1 Installation Support 59.79%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 7.88%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 8.48% 6.3 General Training & Education 32.33%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.29%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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The reconnaissance category is comprised of four platforms: E-3B, E-3C, E-8C, 
and the U-2S. The E-3B and E-3C are organically maintained by “blue-suiters” while the 
other two platforms are contracted out to a third party for its maintenance. The top three 
elements 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 consumed 86.49% of the total expenditures from the years 
1996-2016: E-3B 83.13%, E-3C 82.13%, E-8C 85.31%, and U-2S 94.70%. The 
reconnaissance category also simultaneously recorded the highest 3.0 Maintenance mean 
percentage and the lowest 2.0 Unit Operations mean percentage at 40.53% and 14.13% 
respectfully.  
The findings for the reconnaissance platforms illustrate a unique trend. The E-3B 
and its other variant, the E-3C, were similar in regards to cost mean percentages for the 
various elements, however these two platforms costs behave differently compared to the 
other two platforms being examined, the U-2S and the E-8C. As shown in Table 17, for 
the top three elements the E-3B and E-3C were within one-unit percentage point away 
from each other but diverged significantly from the two other platforms. For 3.0 
Maintenance, the other two platforms drove up the mean significantly, U-2S 67.15% and 
the E-8C at 43.12% while the reconnaissance mean was at 34.98%. This is largely due to 
sub-element 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support. Another finding to note is that Element 2.0 
Unit Operations for U-2S is barely within one standard deviation away from the mean. 
This result is driven by sub-element 2.1.1., Energy, where the U-2S mean of 34.79% is 
significantly lower than the category average of 60.78%. According to the Air Force’s 
internet page af.mil, the U-2S’s “long and narrow wings give the U-2 glider-like 
characteristics” and is equipped with the fuel efficient General Electric F118-101 engine 
allowing the aircraft to stay airborne for extended periods of time without refueling 
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(af.mil, 2017). For element 1.0, The U-2S exceeds one standard deviation away from the 
mean at 17.95% while the reconnaissance mean is 31.83%.  
 The standard deviations and IQR for all elements show that the data points are 
dispersed and that the mean is not a great indicator of a randomly selected data point 
from the sample. For example, element 1.0 has a mean of 31.83% with a standard 
deviation of 10.55% and an IQR 19.03%. Ideally, a smaller standard deviation and a 
much smaller IQR would give the findings more credibility. The results to take away 
from the reconnaissance category is that the E-3B and E-3C are characterize very 
similarly, however the E-8C and U-2S are significantly different than the other two 
platforms.  
Table 17: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements for Reconnaissance 
 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 31.83% 10.55% 32.72% 19.03%
E-3B 40.10% 5.17% 41.08% 9.15%
E-3C 41.14% 4.54% 42.54% 5.87%
E-8C 28.14% 4.52% 27.60% 7.81%
U-2S 17.95% 3.81% 17.39% 3.20%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 14.13% 5.68% 14.83% 9.24%
E-3B 16.71% 4.18% 17.13% 6.86%
E-3C 16.17% 2.97% 16.48% 3.75%
E-8C 14.05% 6.10% 12.64% 6.04%
U-2S 9.60% 6.13% 7.42% 2.71%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 40.53% 18.43% 32.24% 26.81%
E-3B 26.32% 4.39% 27.03% 6.89%
E-3C 25.52% 6.24% 26.79% 7.96%
E-8C 43.12% 9.17% 43.72% 12.38%
U-2S 67.15% 8.19% 70.27% 11.86%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 1.74% 1.97% 1.09% 2.84%
E-3B 3.31% 1.72% 2.50% 2.71%
E-3C 3.31% 1.61% 3.07% 2.48%
E-8C 0.24% 0.36% 0.10% 0.24%
U-2S 0.11% 0.16% 0.07% 0.14%
4.0 Sustaining Support
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Special Duty 
Table 18: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Special Duty 
 
The special duty category is composed of eight aircrafts: AC-130U, EC-130E, 
EC-130H, MC-130E, MC-130H, MC-130P. WC-130H, WC-130J.  These eight aircrafts 
are all variants of the C-130 Hercules utilized for different missions. The AC-130U is 
utilized for ground-attack while the MC-130 variants are utilized by Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC) for different clandestine special operations missions. 
The E-C models are primarily flown for their electronic attack capabilities while the WC-
130 variants are specially designed for weather based reconnaissance missions.  
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 9.00% 8.54% 8.34% 12.17%
E-3B 11.57% 9.04% 9.89% 12.95%
E-3C 11.90% 9.14% 9.93% 12.79%
E-8C 9.94% 7.73% 10.03% 10.32%
U-2S 2.58% 4.21% 0.01% 5.40%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Reconnaissance 2.77% 1.75% 2.17% 1.31%
E-3B 1.99% 0.45% 2.04% 0.65%
E-3C 1.96% 0.49% 2.09% 0.76%
E-8C 4.51% 1.31% 4.20% 1.88%
U-2S 2.61% 2.46% 2.03% 0.61%
6.0 Indirect Support
1 Unit-Level Manpower 42.82% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.10%
1.1 Operations 31.74% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 1.87%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 43.21% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 19.16%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 25.06% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 1.87%
2 Unit Operations 15.29% 4 Sustaining Support 0.84%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 47.71% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 19.66%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 2.81% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 30.32%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 10.89% 4.4 Program Management 7.53%
2.2 Support Services 24.32% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 19.63%
2.3 TDY 13.29% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 20.76%
2.4 Transportaion 0.98% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.10%
3 Maintenance 24.07% 5 Continuing System Improvements 10.05%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 18.67% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 78.54%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 47.47% 5.2 Software Maintenance 21.46%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.44% 6 Indirect Support 6.92%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 5.45% 6.1 Installation Support 68.99%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 8.39%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.73% 6.3 General Training & Education 22.62%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.25%
Special Duty
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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 The first three elements consume 82.18% of the total expenditures for the special 
duty category. As shown in Table 19, the weather reconnaissance specific variances, the 
WC-130H and WC-130J, drive down the mean percentage for element 3.0 at 18.52% and 
12.32% respectfully. The mean for 3.0 is 24.07%. Another interesting result to note is the 
differences between the EC-130 variants. They both have similar mission sets and 
eventually both were replaced by the EC-130J model, however, their O&S cost mean 
percentages are very different. For element 1.0, the difference is 16.18%, element 2.0 it is 
9.69%, and element 3.0 it is 18.68%. These findings go against the traditional assumption 
that variants of the same platform would act similarly in expenditures.    
 Lastly, due to the mission and the hazardous conditions that these aircrafts are 
utilized, an assumption was that 3.0 would consume the largest percentage for special 
duty, however it was 1.0 Unit Level Manpower that consumed 42.82% of the total 
expenditures for the eight aircrafts.  
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Table 19: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements Special Duty 
   
   
   
 
 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 42.82% 12.59% 42.78% 12.76%
AC-130U 41.73% 5.43% 41.06% 4.54%
EC-130E 50.10% 5.93% 50.14% 11.34%
EC-130H 33.92% 16.25% 29.05% 19.03%
MC-130E 44.27% 10.36% 45.28% 11.89%
MC-130H 40.78% 4.79% 41.24% 7.81%
MC-130P 44.28% 7.46% 41.82% 13.19%
WC-130H 40.69% 21.16% 48.39% 20.01%
WC-130J 55.65% 9.11% 53.97% 10.89%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 15.29% 5.35% 14.78% 6.43%
AC-130U 15.46% 3.59% 15.45% 5.13%
EC-130E 21.12% 5.87% 20.75% 7.31%
EC-130H 11.42% 8.49% 8.99% 3.01%
MC-130E 13.54% 3.06% 13.62% 6.01%
MC-130H 14.01% 2.68% 14.21% 3.89%
MC-130P 14.52% 2.87% 14.40% 4.13%
WC-130H 18.43% 3.90% 18.30% 4.26%
WC-130J 19.67% 4.54% 19.11% 5.52%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 24.07% 9.94% 22.46% 12.15%
AC-130U 26.71% 6.80% 24.01% 12.09%
EC-130E 16.77% 2.14% 15.70% 4.29%
EC-130H 35.45% 12.04% 39.46% 16.71%
MC-130E 22.42% 7.60% 20.98% 6.66%
MC-130H 27.90% 5.32% 27.07% 6.89%
MC-130P 22.12% 5.47% 20.48% 6.58%
WC-130H 18.52% 3.83% 18.69% 5.06%
WC-130J 12.32% 10.10% 8.15% 19.73%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 0.84% 0.57% 0.74% 0.57%
AC-130U 0.58% 0.48% 0.39% 0.39%
EC-130E 1.50% 0.70% 1.07% 1.31%
EC-130H 0.46% 0.25% 0.46% 0.40%
MC-130E 0.75% 0.56% 0.83% 1.14%
MC-130H 0.92% 0.48% 0.83% 0.53%
MC-130P 1.06% 0.62% 0.99% 0.56%
WC-130H 1.20% 0.66% 0.98% 0.33%
WC-130J 0.76% 0.29% 0.64% 0.27%
4.0 Sustaining Support
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 10.05% 8.79% 7.28% 11.41%
AC-130U 9.04% 5.67% 7.71% 10.26%
EC-130E 6.08% 2.59% 7.28% 4.16%
EC-130H 15.12% 14.84% 15.18% 22.15%
MC-130E 12.31% 9.41% 9.61% 16.58%
MC-130H 8.79% 5.74% 8.05% 9.72%
MC-130P 10.53% 7.34% 10.01% 13.82%
WC-130H 8.11% 6.50% 5.87% 5.78%
WC-130J 6.45% 7.16% 4.79% 8.88%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Special Duty 6.92% 7.42% 6.14% 3.18%
AC-130U 6.48% 0.90% 6.37% 1.21%
EC-130E 4.44% 2.08% 5.40% 3.63%
EC-130H 3.63% 2.14% 2.35% 3.66%
MC-130E 6.70% 3.46% 5.30% 2.03%
MC-130H 7.60% 1.25% 7.64% 1.54%
MC-130P 7.50% 1.41% 7.60% 2.47%
WC-130H 13.04% 20.15% 5.91% 7.30%
WC-130J 5.15% 3.62% 3.97% 5.89%
6.0 Indirect Support
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Trainer 
Table 20: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Trainer 
 
The Trainers category is represented by five platforms: AT-38B, T-1A, T-6A, T-
37B, T-38A, T-38C. An interesting finding to note is the top three categories only 
accumulated 64.62% of the total expenditures. More investigation found that 24.17% of 
the total expenditures were contributed to 6.0 Indirect Support, specifically, 6.3 General 
Training and Education comprising 82.30% of the 24.17%. This is unique to the trainer 
category because of the specific mission for the Air Force’s Pilot Training Program 
utilizing these specific aircrafts.  
Three of six of the platforms are either fully maintained through CLS or a 
combination of both CLS and organic means. The three CLS maintained mean 
percentages for T-1A (30.94%), T-6A (27.49%), and T-38C (30.03%) are all higher than 
the category mean percentage for 3.0. Maintenance at 26.98%. These findings are aligned 
with the work completed by Ritschel and Ritschel (2016). The aircraft driving down the 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 10.13% 3.5 Other Maintenance 1.18%
1.1 Operations 45.23% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 2.97%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 35.64% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 40.06%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 19.12% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 2.97%
2 Unit Operations 27.50% 4 Sustaining Support 3.40%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 43.36% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 29.31%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 3.17% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 20.95%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.47% 4.4 Program Management 17.74%
2.2 Support Services 46.54% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 2.05%
2.3 TDY 3.31% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 12.66%
2.4 Transportaion 0.14% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 17.29%
3 Maintenance 26.98% 5 Continuing System Improvements 7.80%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 21.73% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 83.55%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 22.12% 5.2 Software Maintenance 16.45%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.75% 6 Indirect Support 24.17%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.61% 6.1 Installation Support 14.75%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.97% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.95%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.08% 6.3 General Training & Education 82.30%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.55%
Trainer
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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mean percentage for 3.0 is the AT-38B (17.62%) a specific variant utilized during 
weapons training. However, 23.30% of the total expenditures for the AT-38B was 
incurred in element 5.0, Continuing System Improvements, while the category mean 
percentage is significantly lower at 7.80%. This could be due to the specificity of the 
aircraft and its training requirements. According to the Air Force main website, the AT-
38B was used to “test experimental equipment such as electrical and weapon systems” 
(AF.mil, 2017). Therefore, the increased cost in 5.0 is directly related to its unique 
weapons training mission.  
 Lastly, the trainer category recorded the lowest mean percentage of the seven 
categories in 1.0 Unit-Level Manpower at 10.13%. According to OSD CAPE, “Unit-
Level Manpower includes the costs of all operators, maintenance, and other support 
manpower at operating units” (OSD-CAPE, 2014). Though the trainer category is heavily 
utilized in Air Education & Training Command (AETC), it is still considered an 
operational wing. However, the nature of the specific training requirements may be the 
reason why element 1.0 doesn’t incur cost like the other aircraft categories.  
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Table 21: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements Trainer 
 
 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 10.13% 4.78% 10.09% 6.72%
AT-38B 10.13% 5.47% 13.15% 11.22%
T-1A 6.20% 2.07% 5.49% 3.49%
T-37B 10.35% 1.60% 10.71% 1.80%
T-38A 14.45% 5.05% 13.08% 6.62%
T-38C 11.28% 5.33% 12.61% 9.45%
T-6A 8.15% 2.20% 8.25% 3.74%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 27.50% 5.88% 26.56% 6.10%
AT-38B 32.85% 5.02% 32.87% 9.12%
T-1A 25.74% 3.48% 26.38% 3.85%
T-37B 29.18% 5.77% 26.22% 9.31%
T-38A 30.91% 5.68% 30.31% 7.67%
T-38C 26.22% 5.44% 27.42% 3.21%
T-6A 21.66% 3.06% 21.24% 4.82%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 26.98% 10.01% 24.82% 11.99%
AT-38B 17.62% 3.31% 17.47% 4.80%
T-1A 30.94% 6.95% 30.69% 9.26%
T-37B 24.02% 5.53% 23.29% 8.76%
T-38A 26.91% 10.27% 22.35% 16.57%
T-38C 30.03% 16.32% 24.64% 14.10%
T-6A 27.49% 4.57% 26.42% 7.15%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 3.40% 2.16% 2.68% 3.49%
AT-38B 1.72% 0.67% 1.72% 1.15%
T-1A 2.86% 0.88% 2.75% 0.57%
T-37B 5.62% 0.93% 5.46% 1.23%
T-38A 1.86% 0.96% 1.50% 1.33%
T-38C 2.21% 1.22% 2.02% 1.78%
T-6A 6.70% 1.52% 6.60% 0.35%
4.0 Sustaining Support
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 7.80% 10.87% 2.80% 10.80%
AT-38B 23.30% 17.60% 24.97% 34.56%
T-1A 2.37% 4.14% 0.53% 4.53%
T-37B 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.06%
T-38A 10.70% 9.73% 5.36% 18.67%
T-38C 11.40% 8.65% 6.55% 16.75%
T-6A 3.23% 4.95% 2.28% 1.69%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Trainer 24.17% 9.94% 26.63% 14.13%
AT-38B 14.38% 8.09% 12.00% 16.49%
T-1A 31.89% 4.65% 31.99% 4.99%
T-37B 30.81% 3.27% 30.21% 3.93%
T-38A 15.17% 7.61% 13.63% 11.78%
T-38C 18.86% 6.86% 19.63% 8.36%
T-6A 32.77% 5.10% 34.12% 6.58%
6.0 Indirect Support
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Transport  
Table 22: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Transport 
 
The transport category is composed of 14 aircrafts: C-130E, C-130H, C-130J, C-
17A, C-21A, C-5A, C-5B, C-5C, HC-130N, KC-10A, KC-135D, KC-135E, KC-135R, 
KC-135T. The first three cost elements consume 84.73% of the total expenditures. Like 
previous categories, CLS or organic maintenance is both utilized in this category. 
However, of the four platforms utilizing the CLS means to maintenance, only one 
platform, the KC-10A with a mean percentage of 36.10%, exceeds the mean percentage 
for the category for element 3.0 with 29.83%.  The other three platforms, the C-130J, C-
17A, and the C-21A all have lower mean percentages for 3.0. These results are unlike the 
other categories results. The three platforms that are driving the maintenance mean 
percentage up is the C-5 series (variation A, B & C). With a mean percentage of 35.09%, 
35.86%, and 37.15%, the C-5 series just within one standard deviation from the category 
mean.  
1 Unit-Level Manpower 32.18% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.35%
1.1 Operations 26.73% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.25%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 49.46% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 29.06%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 23.81% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 22.72% 4 Sustaining Support 1.79%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 69.48% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 18.59%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.09% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 44.49%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.96% 4.4 Program Management 2.57%
2.2 Support Services 11.77% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 11.24%
2.3 TDY 10.26% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 22.71%
2.4 Transportaion 2.44% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.40%
3 Maintenance 29.83% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.84%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 11.09% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 92.01%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 21.87% 5.2 Software Maintenance 7.99%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.17% 6 Indirect Support 4.65%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 25.05% 6.1 Installation Support 77.92%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.58%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 12.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 17.50%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.16%
Transport
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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The variability within the data set is apparent in Table 23. The IQR for all 
elements show the dispersion of the middle 50% of the data points within this category. 
These large IQRs suggest that a randomly selected data point from the population may 
not be representative of the population. With a mean of 32.18% and an IQR of 14.19% 
for element 1.0, a randomly selected variable may not be representative of the whole 
population. 
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Table 23: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements Bomber 
 
   
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 32.18% 9.57% 32.07% 14.19%
C-130E 39.11% 7.28% 41.90% 4.36%
C-130H 40.38% 4.80% 38.81% 7.21%
C-130J 40.20% 10.29% 39.29% 13.93%
C-17A 23.24% 4.59% 22.80% 8.58%
C-21A 36.46% 5.95% 35.85% 6.40%
C-5A 24.17% 6.26% 24.24% 7.72%
C-5B 25.12% 8.14% 24.26% 5.01%
C-5C 28.50% 6.45% 29.70% 12.64%
HC-130N 38.82% 7.15% 39.78% 11.68%
KC-10A 19.24% 3.29% 19.26% 6.07%
KC-135D 40.12% 8.67% 38.99% 8.25%
KC-135E 37.39% 9.09% 36.26% 12.54%
KC-135R 33.14% 2.80% 33.61% 4.52%
KC-135T 31.88% 5.17% 31.67% 4.78%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 22.72% 9.51% 20.08% 11.94%
C-130E 17.94% 3.47% 16.95% 4.79%
C-130H 19.08% 2.33% 18.70% 2.01%
C-130J 16.86% 3.17% 16.69% 4.46%
C-17A 38.42% 4.59% 37.73% 6.88%
C-21A 25.14% 6.70% 26.60% 12.43%
C-5A 17.74% 3.43% 17.20% 6.25%
C-5B 21.18% 3.76% 21.02% 7.02%
C-5C 15.13% 4.60% 15.40% 4.70%
HC-130N 13.59% 3.94% 12.84% 5.46%
KC-10A 38.35% 9.94% 38.51% 17.85%
KC-135D 18.32% 6.47% 19.42% 9.47%
KC-135E 18.15% 5.50% 18.12% 6.79%
KC-135R 24.68% 6.54% 24.71% 9.98%
KC-135T 28.19% 8.09% 27.87% 11.58%
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 29.83% 8.59% 29.52% 11.19%
C-130E 24.95% 5.36% 26.04% 6.33%
C-130H 27.45% 3.33% 28.61% 5.41%
C-130J 24.55% 7.68% 26.25% 5.88%
C-17A 27.47% 7.57% 28.03% 10.01%
C-21A 28.20% 5.31% 27.86% 9.62%
C-5A 35.09% 11.28% 40.04% 12.99%
C-5B 35.86% 8.35% 39.10% 11.56%
C-5C 37.15% 9.85% 38.49% 12.70%
HC-130N 27.12% 7.73% 26.56% 13.91%
KC-10A 36.10% 4.43% 34.70% 8.02%
KC-135D 22.22% 11.95% 20.57% 13.70%
KC-135E 25.78% 10.26% 26.54% 19.44%
KC-135R 30.57% 4.50% 29.52% 6.02%
KC-135T 29.13% 5.09% 28.84% 7.63%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 1.79% 3.69% 1.24% 1.57%
C-130E 7.02% 12.07% 2.30% 2.94%
C-130H 1.29% 0.90% 0.98% 1.47%
C-130J 1.35% 0.92% 1.12% 1.38%
C-17A 0.12% 0.08% 0.09% 0.14%
C-21A 0.44% 0.57% 0.26% 0.58%
C-5A 1.48% 0.71% 1.26% 1.30%
C-5B 1.86% 0.67% 1.65% 1.20%
C-5C 2.62% 0.90% 2.33% 1.62%
HC-130N 1.13% 0.73% 1.00% 1.27%
KC-10A 1.72% 2.22% 0.14% 3.88%
KC-135D 1.97% 1.03% 1.55% 1.31%
KC-135E 1.43% 0.63% 1.26% 0.88%
KC-135R 1.30% 0.64% 0.99% 0.95%
KC-135T 1.49% 0.81% 1.08% 1.52%
4.0 Sustaining Support
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UAV/Drone   
Table 24: OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for UAV/Drone 
 
 The UAV/Drone category is composed of two unmanned aerial vehicles: the MQ-
1B Predator and the MQ-9A Reaper. The Predator started incurring O&S cost in 1997 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 8.84% 9.28% 6.03% 7.84%
C-130E 4.51% 2.63% 4.68% 3.56%
C-130H 5.50% 2.60% 5.34% 3.16%
C-130J 10.59% 8.75% 7.81% 11.79%
C-17A 8.24% 5.25% 7.59% 5.38%
C-21A 3.36% 6.09% 1.14% 3.94%
C-5A 17.39% 16.76% 8.16% 20.81%
C-5B 13.39% 13.47% 5.40% 18.50%
C-5C 12.78% 11.52% 6.87% 18.68%
HC-130N 12.22% 8.83% 9.49% 12.69%
KC-10A 3.53% 2.77% 4.15% 5.16%
KC-135D 11.38% 5.57% 10.40% 11.31%
KC-135E 10.15% 5.56% 10.27% 9.29%
KC-135R 5.97% 5.68% 3.70% 9.05%
KC-135T 6.71% 6.46% 3.80% 11.41%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
Transport/Tanker 4.65% 3.18% 4.32% 3.60%
C-130E 6.48% 2.53% 7.21% 1.50%
C-130H 6.30% 2.00% 5.75% 1.01%
C-130J 6.46% 1.37% 5.96% 2.37%
C-17A 2.51% 0.91% 2.25% 1.33%
C-21A 6.40% 5.81% 5.01% 1.43%
C-5A 4.12% 3.27% 3.08% 1.41%
C-5B 2.58% 0.95% 2.61% 1.17%
C-5C 3.82% 1.40% 3.49% 1.96%
HC-130N 7.13% 2.95% 7.34% 4.24%
KC-10A 1.06% 0.56% 0.94% 0.46%
KC-135D 5.99% 4.95% 6.97% 7.46%
KC-135E 7.09% 2.47% 6.89% 3.64%
KC-135R 4.34% 0.76% 4.45% 1.31%
KC-135T 2.59% 0.52% 2.59% 0.61%
6.0 Indirect Support
1 Unit-Level Manpower 31.92% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 44.78% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.06%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 36.79% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 94.26%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 18.43% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 21.48% 4 Sustaining Support 0.57%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 1.38% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 47.10%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 3.62% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 10.81%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.29% 4.4 Program Management 32.66%
2.2 Support Services 80.05% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 7.07% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 5.33%
2.4 Transportaion 0.60% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 4.09%
3 Maintenance 29.87% 5 Continuing System Improvements 11.18%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 5.45% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 89.64%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.03% 5.2 Software Maintenance 10.36%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.20% 6 Indirect Support 4.98%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 77.92%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 13.19%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 8.89%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
UAV/Drone
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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while the Reaper started incurring cost in 2008 and reaching IOC in 2014. Similar to the 
manned-aircrafts, the MQ-1B and the MQ-9A incurs the majority of their total 
expenditures, 83.27%, in the first three elements 31.92%, 21.48%, and 29.87% 
respectfully. Both vehicles utilize CLS maintenance and the Predator uses 30.69% and 
the Reaper 28.03% of their total expenditures in 3.0 maintenance. A finding that is 
unique to UAV’s is the majority of 2.0 (21.48%) is not consumed in 2.1.1 Energy, which 
makes it unique from the other vehicle categories.  Instead, the majority of the costs 
occur in element 2.2 which is support services. AFTOC includes examples of certain 
costs that would be incurred in 2.2 which includes food services, lease costs for special 
facilities, and transportation of personnel and material to remote operating sites for 
operations, maintenance or support (AFTOC).  
For all elements, all the means fall within one standard deviation from the mean. 
However, with a large IQR, for example for element 1.0, the IQR is 19.70% which is an 
indicator that the mean is not a good representative for the data set. With a more 
dispersed data set it drives up the standard deviation and variance indicating that there is 
a lot of variability within the data points. However, this could be due to the UAV/Drone 
category only having two platforms that are included in this analysis.  
Table 25: Summary Statistics for the OSD-CAPE Cost Elements UAV/Drone 
 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 31.92% 10.79% 31.41% 19.07%
MQ-1B 33.05% 10.21% 32.45% 18.52%
MQ-9A 29.41% 12.24% 31.41% 23.84%
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 21.48% 8.91% 21.15% 12.11%
MQ-1B 24.55% 8.08% 22.82% 9.46%
MQ-9A 14.66% 6.85% 14.78% 9.45%
2.0 Unit Operatioins
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Research Question II 
Compare, contrast, and identify the relationships within the OSD-CAPE Cost Element 
Structure across the aircraft categories (bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, special duty, 
trainer, transport/tanker and UAV/drone). To compare the medians for the categories, we 
utilized the Kruskal-Wallis and Steel Dwaas tests in JMP. As stated in Chapter III, we 
could not perform t-tests comparison because the data is not normally distributed. 
Therefore, we are utilizing non-parametric testing. The null hypothesis of the Kruskal-
Wallis test is that all medians are statistically the same and the alternative hypothesis is 
that at least one median is statistically differentiable.  
HO:  ΔX = ΔY … . =  Δn 
Ha: ΔX ≠ ΔY … .≠  Δn 
For elements 1.0 Unit Level Manpower, 2.0 Unit Operations, 3.0 Maintenance, 
4.0 Sustaining Support, 5.0 Continuing System Improvement, and 6.0 Indirect Support, 
the Kruskal-Wallis test resulted in a p-value < 0.00238 meaning the null hypothesis is 
rejected because at least one median is statistically different from the other medians. 
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 29.87% 10.62% 30.60% 10.79%
MQ-1B 30.69% 12.02% 32.15% 10.16%
MQ-9A 28.03% 6.79% 25.00% 8.22%
3.0 Maintenance
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 0.58% 0.93% 0.18% 0.66%
MQ-1B 0.30% 0.31% 0.18% 0.43%
MQ-9A 1.20% 1.47% 0.19% 2.80%
4.0 Sustaining Support
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 11.18% 10.96% 7.78% 15.77%
MQ-1B 6.76% 6.76% 5.44% 10.95%
MQ-9A 21.00% 12.42% 20.60% 23.56%
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Mean Std Dev Median IQR
UAV 4.98% 2.77% 4.01% 4.72%
MQ-1B 4.65% 2.55% 3.75% 4.31%
MQ-9A 5.71% 3.25% 6.32% 6.55%
6.0 Indirect Support
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However, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not identify where within the data set the 
differences lie. 
 Specifically, for element 1.0 Manpower, 897 platforms were entered in the 
Kruskal-Wallis and the Steel Dwaas test. As stated above, the Kruskal-Wallis test 
resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis in support of the alternative hypothesis, 
stating at least one median is statistically different. Next, the Steel Dwaas test results are 
shown in Table 27 which delineates where within the data set the differences lie. We can 
conclude from Table 27 that the transport/tanker category medians are statistically 
different from the trainer category with a p-value < 0.00238 however the test could not 
statistically differentiate the transport/tanker category between the UAV/drone categories 
for cost element 1.0 with a p-value > 0.00238. Another important result to identify is the 
score mean difference. For example, referencing Table 27, as stated the trainer is 
significantly different than the transport/tanker category additionally the trainer is also 
significantly different from the fighter category. When the mean difference is furthest 
away from zero it entails the strength of the difference between the two categories.  
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Table 26: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 1.0 
 
 
Table 27: Steel Dwaas Test Element 1.0 
 
 We utilized 895 of the 916 platforms when performing the statistical tests for 
element 2.0 Unit Operations. Similar to Table 26, Table 28 illustrates the Kruskal Wallis 
test results in a p- value < 0.0001. Therefore, at least one median is different from the 
other medians. The Steel Dwaas test (Table 29) is conducted and the results portray 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 63 19363 28287 307.349 -4.5
Fighter/Attack 221 109896 99229 497.267 3.19
Reconnaissance 84 39186 37716 466.5 0.65
Special Duty 132 92077 59268 697.553 11.935
Trainer 99 5560 44451 56.162 -15.995
Transport/Tanker 269 123295 120781 458.346 0.707
UAV/Drone 29 13376 13021 461.241 0.258
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
1.0 Unit Level Manpower
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
376.3871 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehm Lower CL Upper CL
Transport/Tanker Trainer 181.589 12.5048 14.5215 <.0001* 0.220374 0.191598 0.248239
Special Duty Fighter/Attack 96.484 11.22542 8.5952 <.0001* 0.101045 0.068351 0.13033
Special Duty Bomber 84.287 8.64201 9.7531 <.0001* 0.179042 0.143255 0.212817
Fighter/Attack Bomber 77.655 11.72961 6.6204 <.0001* 0.076203 0.046744 0.109654
Transport/Tanker Bomber 66.294 13.43455 4.9346 <.0001* 0.060523 0.024404 0.096038
UAV/Drone Trainer 60.723 7.83245 7.7528 <.0001* 0.22185 0.162346 0.282193
Special Duty Reconnaissance 59.269 8.72301 6.7946 <.0001* 0.111441 0.06438 0.160236
Reconnaissance Bomber 24.403 7.09656 3.4387 0.0105* 0.067054 0.010495 0.117468
UAV/Drone Bomber 16.617 5.99197 2.7733 0.0811 0.064062 -0.00333 0.126559
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker 1.031 16.84171 0.0612 1 0.00114 -0.06224 0.063772
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance -0.765 7.0567 -0.1085 1 -0.002426 -0.07529 0.072623
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance -2.539 12.75469 -0.199 1 -0.002508 -0.04235 0.037878
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack -9.521 11.30405 -0.8423 0.9805 -0.011663 -0.05534 0.027261
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack -10.688 14.28207 -0.7484 0.9895 -0.015877 -0.07823 0.041802
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack -25.799 12.85505 -2.0069 0.4101 -0.017846 -0.04332 0.008012
UAV/Drone Special Duty -45.15 9.56108 -4.7223 <.0001* -0.115208 -0.18207 -0.04555
Trainer Bomber -79.792 7.56015 -10.5543 <.0001* -0.15653 -0.18383 -0.13016
Trainer Reconnaissance -88.76 7.858 -11.2955 <.0001* -0.230301 -0.27465 -0.17861
Trainer Special Duty -113.688 8.88507 -12.7954 <.0001* -0.335769 -0.36424 -0.30797
Transport/Tanker Special Duty -120.73 12.31696 -9.802 <.0001* -0.116607 -0.14789 -0.08483
Trainer Fighter/Attack -158.662 11.18918 -14.1799 <.0001* -0.237993 -0.2656 -0.21082
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where within the categories the differences lie. A result to note is that the bomber 
category, median 15.14%, and the special duty category, median 14.78%, are the most 
similar statistically in regards to their score mean difference of -5.331. Also, the 
UAV/drone category is not statistically different from the transport/tanker category with 
a score mean difference of -6.5 however these two categories are extremely different in 
regards to mission and size of the average platform within each category.  
Table 28: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 2.0 
 
 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 63 19753 28224 313.54 -4.282
Fighter/Attack 227 93563 101696 412.172 -2.417
Reconnaissance 83 22199 37184 267.458 -6.68
Special Duty 135 38917 60480 288.274 -7.79
Trainer 96 71852 43008 748.458 12.052
Transport/Tanker 263 140261 117824 533.312 6.369
UAV/Drone 28 14415 12544 514.821 1.389
2.0 Unit Operations
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
273.627 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
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Table 29: Steel Dwaas Test Element 2.0 
 
We utilized 900 of the 916 platforms when performing the statistical tests for 
element 3.0 Maintenance. Referencing to Table 31, it also shows where the differences 
lie between the medians for all categories. Referencing the scored mean difference of -
102.481, the fighter and special duty category have the most statistically different 
medians when compared to each other. While, like element 2.0, the UAV/drone category 
is statistically similar to the transport/tanker category. Referencing to the results in 
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehmann Lower CL Upper CL
Trainer Fighter/Attack 139.111 11.36936 12.2356 <.0001* 0.095515 0.077216 0.113015
Trainer Special Duty 109.538 8.92201 12.2773 <.0001* 0.122436 0.104536 0.141094
Transport/Tanker Special Duty 108.005 12.17963 8.8677 <.0001* 0.057441 0.038631 0.078494
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance 97.607 12.59312 7.7508 <.0001* 0.069456 0.04342 0.096468
Trainer Reconnaissance 85.355 7.76648 10.9902 <.0001* 0.131144 0.106292 0.155958
Transport/Tanker Bomber 77.816 13.22065 5.8859 <.0001* 0.055158 0.028554 0.084074
Trainer Bomber 74.387 7.46553 9.964 <.0001* 0.119136 0.094446 0.143406
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack 69.526 12.8279 5.4199 <.0001* 0.030997 0.013964 0.048597
UAV/Drone Special Duty 40.34 9.80106 4.1159 0.0008* 0.057506 0.01703 0.097926
Fighter/Attack Bomber 37.92 11.94182 3.1754 0.0252* 0.023637 0.001876 0.045281
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack 33.359 14.7733 2.2581 0.2647 0.029343 -0.009381 0.067596
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance 28.92 7.03434 4.1113 0.0008* 0.065949 0.020386 0.10948
UAV/Drone Bomber 20.351 5.99923 3.3923 0.0123* 0.053561 0.007388 0.095713
Special Duty Reconnaissance 9.436 8.79796 1.0725 0.9362 0.007667 -0.013951 0.029626
Special Duty Bomber -5.331 8.74307 -0.6098 0.9965 -0.00478 -0.027275 0.018392
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker -6.5 16.72773 -0.3886 0.9997 -0.006459 -0.056072 0.040103
Reconnaissance Bomber -9.772 7.06662 -1.3829 0.8112 -0.013085 -0.039992 0.014863
UAV/Drone Trainer -33.791 7.71918 -4.3775 0.0002* -0.067528 -0.1093 -0.023839
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack -58.969 11.49739 -5.1289 <.0001* -0.036439 -0.056586 -0.016084
Special Duty Fighter/Attack -60.257 11.37343 -5.298 <.0001* -0.027877 -0.043314 -0.012552
Transport/Tanker Trainer -84.581 12.3749 -6.8349 <.0001* -0.065502 -0.086406 -0.041773
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Question 1, the transport/tanker category has a median of 29.52% for element 3.0 
maintenance while the UAV/drone category has category median 30.60%.  
Table 30: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 3.0 
 
 
Table 31: Steel Dwaas Test Element 3.0 
 
 We utilized 885 of the 916 platforms when performing the statistical tests for 
Element 4.0 Sustaining Support. Table 32 illustrates at least one median that is 
statistically different from the others. The Steel Dwaas results in Table 33, when 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 57 36221 25678.5 635.456 5.55
Fighter/Attack 229 125867 103165 549.638 6.684
Reconnaissance 84 47155 37842 561.369 4.105
Special Duty 138 37809 62169 273.978 -8.669
Trainer 99 31444 44599.5 317.616 -5.391
Transport/Tanker 267 115108 120284 431.116 -1.453
UAV/Drone 26 11846 11713 455.615 0.101
3.0 Manpower
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
168.4398 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehmann Lower CL Upper CL
Transport/Tanker Special Duty 81.795 12.27248 6.66489 <.0001* 0.065143 0.038135 0.091307
Transport/Tanker Trainer 53.945 12.44945 4.33315 0.0003* 0.043588 0.014498 0.071804
UAV/Drone Special Duty 40.154 10.15241 3.95516 0.0015* 0.073893 0.021118 0.123901
UAV/Drone Trainer 24.403 7.98363 3.05659 0.0363* 0.052026 0.002452 0.101807
Trainer Special Duty 16.662 9.03003 1.8452 0.5172 0.020747 -0.011898 0.054622
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack 12.342 11.54413 1.06911 0.9371 0.017951 -0.032196 0.091399
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker 9.138 17.40638 0.52497 0.9985 0.008094 -0.039396 0.053212
Reconnaissance Bomber -6.935 7.00964 -0.98937 0.9565 -0.023919 -0.071563 0.084218
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance -12.869 7.15875 -1.7976 0.5496 -0.04744 -0.186167 0.029319
Fighter/Attack Bomber -16.871 12.24225 -1.37811 0.8137 -0.01892 -0.056163 0.026244
UAV/Drone Bomber -23.438 5.70431 -4.10887 0.0008* -0.062154 -0.101496 -0.019657
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack -33.856 15.26389 -2.21803 0.2856 -0.046418 -0.103417 0.016733
Trainer Reconnaissance -44.815 7.858 -5.70307 <.0001* -0.100035 -0.173439 -0.05033
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance -49.65 12.69383 -3.91134 0.0018* -0.059723 -0.125427 -0.013657
Trainer Bomber -57.363 7.51154 -7.63667 <.0001* -0.1152 -0.146418 -0.080076
Special Duty Reconnaissance -63.649 8.88865 -7.16069 <.0001* -0.123716 -0.202315 -0.073932
Special Duty Bomber -72.598 8.88577 -8.17017 <.0001* -0.136084 -0.166106 -0.103178
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack -73.098 12.9091 -5.66255 <.0001* -0.050409 -0.07839 -0.024255
Trainer Fighter/Attack -81.078 11.40633 -7.10813 <.0001* -0.092695 -0.127088 -0.061262
Transport/Tanker Bomber -87.541 13.66794 -6.40485 <.0001* -0.067932 -0.096542 -0.039258
Special Duty Fighter/Attack -102.481 11.43252 -8.96395 <.0001* -0.112897 -0.14954 -0.080229
77 
referencing the score mean difference, portray that the bomber and the transport/tanker 
category are the most different platforms regarding 4.0 sustaining support. Additionally, 
the reconnaissance and transport/tanker categories are statistically the same with a score 
mean difference of 7.422 and a p-value = .9971. The mean and median expenditure 
percentages are the lowest for all six elements at 1.94% and 1.31%.  
Table 32: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 4.0 
 
 
 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 58 42603 25694 734.534 8.985
Fighter/Attack 221 98850.5 97903 447.287 0.288
Reconnaissance 84 33336 37212 396.857 -1.739
Special Duty 132 37004 58476 280.333 -7.926
Trainer 101 68316 44743 676.396 9.749
Transport/Tanker 263 108581 116509 412.856 -2.281
UAV/Drone 26 3364.5 11518 129.404 -6.349
4.0 Sustaining Support
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
258.6839 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
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Table 33: Steel Dwaas Test Element 4.0 
 
 We utilized 885 of the 916 platforms when performing the statistical tests for 
Element 5.0 Continuing System Improvements. The results portray that the majority of 
categories when compared to each other are not distinguishable from one another. The 
bomber category stands out as statistically different from five categories: reconnaissance, 
special duty, trainer, transport/tanker, and fighter. The only other category that is 
different is the trainer category which is statistically different from the fighter, special 
duty and transport/tanker category. However, the mean and median percentages for 
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehmann Lower CL Upper CL
Trainer Special Duty 102.422 8.91098 11.494 <.0001* 0.019971 0.015962 0.024964
Trainer Fighter/Attack 96.509 11.18175 8.631 <.0001* 0.014207 0.009837 0.020928
Transport/Tanker Special Duty 65.498 12.17835 5.3782 <.0001* 0.004677 0.002058 0.007385
Trainer Reconnaissance 44.233 7.90733 5.5939 <.0001* 0.015662 0.009199 0.023854
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance 7.422 12.57193 0.5903 0.9971 0.000549 -0.005185 0.005158
Special Duty Reconnaissance -8.873 8.72292 -1.0172 0.9503 -0.002461 -0.011865 0.002593
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack -13.793 11.30399 -1.2202 0.8866 -0.001733 -0.00725 0.004697
Trainer Bomber -14.209 7.58563 -1.8732 0.4983 -0.006324 -0.015425 0.003588
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack -20.068 12.76295 -1.5724 0.7001 -0.001327 -0.003812 0.001209
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance -20.474 7.15785 -2.8603 0.0641 -0.007714 -0.02326 0.000047
UAV/Drone Bomber -40.134 5.75702 -6.9713 <.0001* -0.032747 -0.045178 -0.023958
Reconnaissance Bomber -40.703 7.02257 -5.796 <.0001* -0.022621 -0.030723 -0.013019
UAV/Drone Special Duty -51.078 9.81728 -5.2029 <.0001* -0.004779 -0.007182 -0.002174
UAV/Drone Trainer -61.831 8.09414 -7.639 <.0001* -0.024285 -0.039826 -0.017406
Special Duty Bomber -83.994 8.66321 -9.6954 <.0001* -0.028408 -0.036158 -0.022416
Special Duty Fighter/Attack -86.187 11.22542 -7.6778 <.0001* -0.006601 -0.008712 -0.004295
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack -97.665 14.81321 -6.5931 <.0001* -0.011332 -0.015326 -0.007184
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker -99.891 17.18061 -5.8141 <.0001* -0.009163 -0.014977 -0.004516
Fighter/Attack Bomber -108.995 11.90371 -9.1564 <.0001* -0.022474 -0.029174 -0.016547
Transport/Tanker Trainer -112.874 12.31736 -9.1638 <.0001* -0.016084 -0.022176 -0.011263
Transport/Tanker Bomber -123.6 13.46322 -9.1806 <.0001* -0.023512 -0.03002 -0.017948
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element 5.0 is 9.05% and 6.60% respectfully, therefore it incurs only a small percentage 
of the expenditures compared to the top three elements.   
Table 34: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 5.0 
 
 
Table 35: Steel Dwaas Test Element 5.0 
 
 We utilized 888 of the 916 platforms when performing the statistical tests for 
element 6.0 Indirect Support. Like the previous five elements, the Kruskal-Wallis test 
resulted in a p-value <0.0001. The Steel Dwaas results were aligned with our assumption 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 62 42836 27156 690.903 8.175
Fighter/Attack 220 90819.5 96360 412.816 -1.708
Reconnaissance 82 36511.5 35916 445.262 0.273
Special Duty 136 66491 59568 488.904 2.556
Trainer 95 29505 41610 310.579 -5.205
Transport/Tanker 251 102928 109938 410.072 -2.073
UAV/Drone 29 14159 12702 488.241 1.088
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
98.2312 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehmann Lower CL Upper CL
Transport/Tanker Trainer 49.422 12.04817 4.10206 0.0008* 0.020683 0.00558 0.036636
Special Duty Fighter/Attack 31.442 11.22507 2.80101 0.0753 0.016109 -0.000877 0.035745
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker 24.157 15.88117 1.52112 0.7322 0.019905 -0.017085 0.072738
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack 22.461 14.22454 1.57901 0.6959 0.019905 -0.017001 0.075682
UAV/Drone Trainer 19.489 7.60877 2.56138 0.138 0.040676 -0.001497 0.090344
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack 16.205 11.29293 1.43496 0.7829 0.009812 -0.011238 0.03516
Special Duty Reconnaissance 10.605 8.81791 1.20265 0.8934 0.010825 -0.019908 0.037629
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance 5.485 6.94155 0.79012 0.986 0.013778 -0.035416 0.075682
UAV/Drone Special Duty 1.192 9.77183 0.12202 1 0.001619 -0.040031 0.057023
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack -5.54 12.5701 -0.44072 0.9994 -0.001787 -0.014598 0.010192
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance -11.689 12.24513 -0.95462 0.9634 -0.0087 -0.036213 0.012685
UAV/Drone Bomber -16.575 5.942 -2.78953 0.0777 -0.058781 -0.117923 0.004784
Trainer Reconnaissance -20.006 7.70669 -2.59596 0.1271 -0.027255 -0.058565 0.000215
Transport/Tanker Special Duty -35.91 11.9105 -3.01498 0.0411* -0.016525 -0.034277 -0.00038
Reconnaissance Bomber -37.26 7.01769 -5.3095 <.0001* -0.074852 -0.114229 -0.035838
Trainer Fighter/Attack -42.269 11.17483 -3.7825 0.0030* -0.024088 -0.042182 -0.003968
Trainer Special Duty -46.352 8.93433 -5.18807 <.0001* -0.033825 -0.055915 -0.014512
Special Duty Bomber -46.835 8.78083 -5.33375 <.0001* -0.063752 -0.100915 -0.030453
Trainer Bomber -52.924 7.41909 -7.13351 <.0001* -0.103687 -0.138594 -0.067632
Fighter/Attack Bomber -99.393 11.72457 -8.47729 <.0001* -0.087683 -0.118274 -0.059781
Transport/Tanker Bomber -105.523 12.8347 -8.22172 <.0001* -0.085949 -0.117734 -0.057703
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that the trainer category would be significantly different from all seven categories. The 
trainer median for element 6.0 is 26.63% while the median for all platforms is 4.28%. 
This is because trainer category incurring significantly more expenditures in 6.3: General 
Training and Education than any other category due to the nature of the mission for these 
platforms. 
Table 36: Kruskal Wallis Test Element 6.0 
 
 
Level Count Score Sum Expected Score Score Mean (Mean-Mean0)/Std0
Bomber 60 8861 26670 147.683 -9.283
Fighter/Attack 225 88083 100013 391.48 -3.588
Reconnaissance 76 15775 33782 207.566 -8.421
Special Duty 133 73111 59118.5 549.707 5.13
Trainer 101 82756 44894.5 819.366 15.602
Transport/Tanker 264 112487 117348 426.087 -1.391
UAV/Drone 29 13643 12890.5 470.448 0.554
6.0 Indirect Support
Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
394.5995 6 <.0001*
1-Way Test, ChiSquare Approximation
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Table 37: Steel Dwaas Test Element 6.0 
 
 Table 38 summarizes the findings of the Steel Dwaas tests for question two across 
all six elements. It sums up the total times the category was statistically different across 
the six elements. It illustrates that the Trainer category is the most statistically different 
category when compared to the other six categories while the UAV/Drone and 
Reconnaissance categories were the most non-distinguishable across all seven categories.  
Table 38: Summary of Question II's Significant Results 
 
 Table 39 color coordinates the results from the six Steel Dwaas tests. When a 
category is highlighted red, this indicates the category is statistically more expensive than 
the category it is compared too, the blue highlighted categories. However, if the 
Level Level Score Mean Difference Std Err Dif Z p-Value Hodges-Lehmann Lower CL Upper CL
Trainer Fighter/Attack 158.775 11.28883 14.0648 <.0001* 0.225779 0.195665 0.247349
Transport/Tanker Bomber 108.665 13.39734 8.1109 <.0001* 0.022548 0.013637 0.031208
Fighter/Attack Bomber 107.403 11.97486 8.969 <.0001* 0.018502 0.012431 0.024833
Trainer Special Duty 104.327 8.93455 11.6768 <.0001* 0.204617 0.172509 0.229662
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance 92.651 12.79548 7.2409 <.0001* 0.017386 0.010244 0.026675
Trainer Reconnaissance 88.396 7.78082 11.3608 <.0001* 0.243603 0.200579 0.267799
Special Duty Fighter/Attack 86.925 11.31938 7.6793 <.0001* 0.021626 0.014369 0.0285
Trainer Bomber 80.487 7.599 10.5918 <.0001* 0.247524 0.201397 0.272902
Special Duty Reconnaissance 74.881 8.69626 8.6107 <.0001* 0.037891 0.029988 0.044217
Special Duty Bomber 73.899 8.68693 8.5069 <.0001* 0.041848 0.034292 0.049064
UAV/Drone Bomber 33.682 5.84314 5.7644 <.0001* 0.023018 0.009908 0.048656
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance 32.038 6.64731 4.8197 <.0001* 0.018932 0.006126 0.045142
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack 25.952 12.82103 2.0242 0.3991 0.00384 -0.001851 0.009598
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack 23.434 14.49516 1.6167 0.6715 0.00827 -0.00574 0.026326
Reconnaissance Bomber 19.759 6.80497 2.9036 0.0568 0.003071 -0.000082 0.006932
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker 16.552 16.57485 0.9986 0.9545 0.005152 -0.010362 0.021093
UAV/Drone Special Duty -11.466 9.61376 -1.1927 0.8972 -0.009097 -0.028726 0.010215
UAV/Drone Trainer -59.519 7.93649 -7.4994 <.0001* -0.210291 -0.253237 -0.154505
Transport/Tanker Special Duty -65.166 12.20151 -5.3408 <.0001* -0.015868 -0.024577 -0.007397
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack -89.288 11.54732 -7.7323 <.0001* -0.014307 -0.020135 -0.008389
Transport/Tanker Trainer -172.446 12.34469 -13.9692 <.0001* -0.218487 -0.242215 -0.189156
Level Bomber Fighter/Attack Reconnaissance Special Duty Trainer Transport/Tanker UAV/Drone
1.0 Unit Level Manpower 4 3 2 5 6 3 1
2.0 Unit Operations 2 4 4 4 6 5 3
3.0 Maintenance 4 3 3 5 5 6 3
4.0 Sustaining Support 5 4 2 5 5 4 5
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 4 2 1 2 4 2 0
6.0 Indirect Support 5 4 5 5 6 4 3
Total 24 20 17 26 32 24 15
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categories are both highlighted green it indicates that test results indicate the two 
category’s expenditures are statistically not differentiable.  
Table 39: Results from the Steel Dwaas Tests 
 
 
 
Level Level
Transport/Tanker Trainer
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
Special Duty Bomber
Fighter/Attack Bomber
Transport/Tanker Bomber
UAV/Drone Trainer
Special Duty Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance Bomber
UAV/Drone Bomber
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Special Duty
Trainer Bomber
Trainer Reconnaissance
Trainer Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Trainer Fighter/Attack
1.0 Unit Level Manpower
Level Level
Trainer Fighter/Attack
Trainer Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
Trainer Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Bomber
Trainer Bomber
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Special Duty
Fighter/Attack Bomber
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
UAV/Drone Bomber
Special Duty Reconnaissance
Special Duty Bomber
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
Reconnaissance Bomber
UAV/Drone Trainer
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Trainer
2.0 Unit Operations
Level Level
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Trainer
UAV/Drone Special Duty
UAV/Drone Trainer
Trainer Special Duty
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
Reconnaissance Bomber
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
Fighter/Attack Bomber
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Bomber
Trainer Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
Trainer Bomber
Special Duty Reconnaissance
Special Duty Bomber
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
Trainer Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Bomber
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
3.0 Maintenance
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Research Question III 
What are the potential cost drivers and cost estimating relationships within the 
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure? On a micro level, cost drivers and cost estimating 
relationships are unique to each individual platform and category as illustrated in research 
question one. However, on a macro level when the individual cost elements are all treated 
as independent variables when creating a correlation matrix (provided in the Appendix A-
D due to the size), we are able to identify which elements/sub-elements were closely 
correlated. As aligned with our assumptions, sub-element 1.2 Unit Level Maintenance is 
negatively correlated with sub-element 1.1 Operations. This illustrates that as sub-
element 1.1 increases than sub-element 1.2 will decrease. Also aligned with our 
assumption, sub-element 3.2.1 DLR Fly is negatively correlated with sub-element 3.7 
Contractor Logistics Support. DLR Fly incurs cost when maintenance is done organically 
Level Level
Trainer Special Duty
Trainer Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Trainer Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
Special Duty Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
Trainer Bomber
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
UAV/Drone Bomber
Reconnaissance Bomber
UAV/Drone Special Duty
UAV/Drone Trainer
Special Duty Bomber
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
Fighter/Attack Bomber
Transport/Tanker Trainer
Transport/Tanker Bomber
4.0 Sustaining Support
Level Level
Transport/Tanker Trainer
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Trainer
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
Special Duty Reconnaissance
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
UAV/Drone Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
UAV/Drone Bomber
Trainer Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Trainer Fighter/Attack
Reconnaissance Bomber
Trainer Special Duty
Special Duty Bomber
Trainer Bomber
Fighter/Attack Bomber
Transport/Tanker Bomber
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
Level Level
Trainer Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Bomber
Fighter/Attack Bomber
Trainer Special Duty
Transport/Tanker Reconnaissance
Trainer Reconnaissance
Special Duty Fighter/Attack
Trainer Bomber
Special Duty Reconnaissance
Special Duty Bomber
UAV/Drone Bomber
UAV/Drone Reconnaissance
Transport/Tanker Fighter/Attack
UAV/Drone Fighter/Attack
Reconnaissance Bomber
UAV/Drone Transport/Tanker
UAV/Drone Special Duty
UAV/Drone Trainer
Transport/Tanker Special Duty
Reconnaissance Fighter/Attack
Transport/Tanker Trainer
6.0 Indirect Support
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at the unit level by “blue suiters”, however Contractor Logistics Support incurs cost when 
the maintenance is contracted out to a third party. Therefore, if sub-element 3.7 is 
incurring substantial cost than the weapon system is most likely not going to incur cost in 
sub-element 3.2.1, unless the weapon system is both maintained organically and 
contractor support. The most correlated relationship is sub-element 6.1 Installation 
Support to sub-element 6.3 General Training & Education at -.96. The only sub-element 
that is correlated to a level one element is 3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 
which is correlated to element 6.0 Indirect Support at .72. However, there is no clear 
reason for the correlation therefore it could be a spurious relationship with no direct 
casual connection.  
Summary 
 This chapter outlines the results of the research questions. It provides the results 
from the descriptive statistics methods and statistical tests that were outlined in the third 
chapter. First it shows the mean/median/quartile ranges for all categories and platforms. 
Followed by the results of the Kruskal-Wallis and Steel Dwaas tests that identified the 
categories that were statistically different when compared to each other. Lastly, it 
provided insight into the correlations between elements and sub-elements. Chapter Five 
utilizes these results presented in Chapter Four to derive our conclusion.  
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Chapter V: Conclusions  
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide the conclusions to the three research 
questions and our recommendations regarding each. The chapter also outlines the 
importance from the findings and how the findings can benefit the acquisition and cost 
analysis community.  The major findings include the characterization of the different 
aircraft categories and platforms based on the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure (CES), 
the statistical comparisons between the aircraft categories, and some insight into the 
correlations between the cost elements/sub-elements.  
Research Question I 
 Question one is the driving research question into investigating the cost 
expenditures within the OSD-CAPE CES for the various aircraft categories and 
platforms. As illustrated in chapter four and the graphs/tables regarding the individual 
aircraft platforms and categories, the individual platforms within a category vary greatly 
from one another. Therefore, for example, when creating an analogy based estimate it is 
important to identify the most similar aircraft within the category. The variability of the 
data also show that these aircrafts are more unique than originally assumed prior to this 
research. Our assumption when starting this thesis was that aircrafts within the same 
category should be similar with small variability, however as noted in the results for the 
various categories, specifically the bomber category, aircrafts within the same category 
are sometimes on the opposite ends of the spectrum.  
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 The major finding of research question one is that the majority of cost is incurred 
in the first three elements: 1.0 Unit Level Manpower, 2.0 Unit Operations and 3.0 
Maintenance. For all 52 aircrafts analyzed, the top three elements incurred a mean 
percentage of 82.38% of the total expenditures. Table 40 illustrates the summary statistics 
for all 52 aircrafts analyzed. As portrayed by Table 40, the first three elements are the 
cost passengers. Therefore, the majority of the analysis focuses on the results of these 
elements. The belief within the Department of Defense acquisition community that these 
three elements accumulated the majority of O&S cost incurred is aligned with the results 
of question one.  
Table 40: Summary Statistics for the 52 Aircrafts Analyzed 
 
 The results also illustrate a trend that when maintenance is contracted out, 
identified if cost is accumulated in 3.7 Contactor Logistic Support, the overarching 
element 3.0 Maintenance incurs more of the expenditures than if the platform was 
organically maintained. In this constrained budgetary environment, these findings can be 
beneficial for decision makers when deciding if new platforms should be organically 
maintained by “blue-suiters” or contracted out.  
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Research Question II 
 The findings of question one directly leads to our search in identifying the 
relationships between each category (bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, special duty, 
trainer, transport/tanker and UAV/drone) in question two. The results of question two is 
aligned with our assumptions during the investigation phase of this research. We assume 
that the median percentage would vary greatly between platforms and in some cases, 
according to Table 41 regarding the Steel Dwaas results, it does. Table 41 conveys how 
many times a category was statistically different from another category per cost element. 
The trainer category was the most significantly different category with 32 instances in 
which the Steel Dwaas test concluded it was statistically different from another category 
across all six elements. In contrast, the UAV/Drone category resulted in the least 
statistically different results when compared across the other six categories with a total of 
15 different instances.  
Table 41: Summary of Question II's Significant Results 
 
Another result to note is the magnitude of the difference when comparing 
categories. Depending on the element, some of these categories are statistically different 
from one another and the difference varies significantly. When the score mean difference 
is further away from 0, regardless of sign (positive/negative), it signifies the strength of 
the difference between the two platforms being compared. However, the results also 
Level Bomber Fighter/Attack Reconnaissance Special Duty Trainer Transport/Tanker UAV/Drone
1.0 Unit Level Manpower 4 3 2 5 6 3 1
2.0 Unit Operations 2 4 4 4 6 5 3
3.0 Maintenance 4 3 3 5 5 6 3
4.0 Sustaining Support 5 4 2 5 5 4 5
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 4 2 1 2 4 2 0
6.0 Indirect Support 5 4 5 5 6 4 3
Total 24 20 17 26 32 24 15
88 
outline the similarities between different categories. These findings are valuable to cost 
estimators regardless of program office. The intent of this question is to enable cost 
estimators to have a baseline comparison when creating estimates. For example, in some 
cases highlighted in the Wilcoxon-Man-Whitney test for Element 1.0 Unit Level 
Manpower, the UAV/drone category incurs cost very similarly to the transport/tanker 
category. Therefore, if needed, one program office can contact the other to seek advice if 
a problem was to occur during the estimation process, adding an additional outlet for 
guidance and educational purposes.  
Research Question III 
 The results from question three were not as fruitful as originally anticipated. 
Before the research began, one of our assumptions followed the idea that cost sub-
elements could potentially have cost estimating relationships and significant correlations 
with the other overarching level one elements. This thought led to the belief that certain 
elements can be used as metrics for sub-elements. However, only a few significant 
correlations were found.  In these cases where correlations are present, the majority of 
these correlations are expected given the relationship of the CES.  For example, as stated 
in chapter four, sub-element 1.2 Unit Level Maintenance is negatively correlated with 
sub-element 1.1 Operations. This conveys that the more 1.1 incurs in expenditures the 
less 1.2 incurs. Therefore, these findings are not as useful as originally anticipated.  
According to the correlation table, no sub-element (level two or level three) is 
significantly correlated to any of the six-overarching level one elements.  
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Significance of Research 
 This research provides decision makers and cost estimators a better understanding 
on where within the OSD-CAPE CES the expenditures truly lie for the various categories 
and platforms. Also, where within the CES the majority of the cost exists. Through 
referencing the variability of each category, cost estimators have a more realistic picture 
of how different the platforms within a category are from one another. Lastly, this 
research could benefit cost estimators across the various program offices in the Air Force 
by understanding how their specific program incurs cost and how it relates to the other 
programs Air Force wide.  Only when cost estimators truly understand how these 
platforms incur costs can we achieve more efficient ways to estimate and cut costs in this 
limited resource environment.  
Limitations 
 One of the first limitations is the accuracy of the data set. The data set was pulled 
from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database however some costs were 
zeroed out for no identifiable reason. For example, the WC-130H, from the years 1996-
1998 did not incur any costs in 1.0 Unit Level Manpower. However, the aircraft incurred 
flying hours during these years which undoubtedly requires manpower.  Therefore, 
during the investigation process we had to exclude those years. Another limitation is the 
inconsistency of the number of platforms investigated for each category. The more data 
the more reliable the results are. However, the UAV/drone only had two platforms, the 
bomber category had three platforms, while the fighter and transport/tanker categories 
each had fifteen and fourteen platforms respectfully. This limitation is due to the 
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availability in the Air Force arsenal. In the years to come, when more UAV/drones are in 
the arsenal, cost estimators will have more information and more data to get a better 
indicator of where the cost is truly incurred within the CES. Lastly, when a platform is 
either being phased-in or phased-out, the costs act sporadically. Therefore, the results for 
the platforms being phased in (F-35A, A-10C and MQ-9A etc.) act differently than 
platforms that have reached stability. The data for the various other stable platforms 
illustrate a small standard deviation between a single element year to year while 
platforms being phased in/out have large variability from year to year.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Multiple avenues for future research can be taken to continue on this research into 
the investigation of cost expenditures within the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure. 
First, some platforms within the same category vary greatly from one another per CES. 
We recommend an investigation into the root differences between these platforms due to 
the belief it would help cost estimators and decision makers alike. Deriving the 
conclusions on why this variability occurs can supplements this research and the results 
of this thesis because we identified the descriptive statistics for the various platforms and 
categories however did not deeply investigate into the reasoning of the variability. 
Second, we suggest future researchers perform a deeper investigation into Cost 
Estimating Relationships (CERs) as highlighted in question three. Perhaps a regression 
model to derive CERs can potentially lead to significant findings. Lastly, an investigation 
into why certain categories and platforms incur cost differently. For example, element 1.0 
Unit Level Manpower for special duty category incurs 42.82% of the total expenditures 
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while the trainer category incurs only 10.13% of total expenditures for manpower. An 
investigation to why this is could be beneficial to cost estimators, stakeholders, and 
decision-makers alike.  
Summary 
 The descriptive statistics and statistical significant results that were derived from 
the investigation into the cost incurred within the OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure are 
beneficial to all stakeholders within the cost estimating community. Though AFTOC was 
established in 1996, the exploration into the descriptive statistics based on the OSD-
CAPE CES is nonexistent to date. Therefore, these findings are instrumental in 
establishing baselines for various categories and platforms based on the data.  
In order to understand the complexity of cost estimating each weapon system, the 
DoD and other stakeholders must understand where the true cost lies within each 
platform and category. The data needed to understand the true actual costs and the 
relationships within the expenditures for each platform are present within AFTOC. 
Utilizing AFTOC to study the historical cost to predict the future costs of our weapon 
systems will serve essential for cost estimators and stakeholders alike. In today’s 
environment, weapon systems continue to grow in price and costs while the budget for 
our nation’s defense is continuing to decline. Therefore, understanding and investigating 
the information provided about our arsenal is more essential now than ever before.  
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Appendix A: Level One Element Correlation Table 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1.00 -0.28 -0.43 -0.16 -0.21 -0.41
2 -0.28 1.00 -0.31 -0.03 -0.26 0.19
3 -0.43 -0.31 1.00 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25
4 -0.16 -0.03 -0.12 1.00 -0.02 0.15
5 -0.21 -0.26 -0.19 -0.02 1.00 -0.18
6 -0.41 0.19 -0.25 0.15 -0.18 1.00
1.1 -0.17 0.21 -0.18 0.01 0.00 0.32
1.2 0.00 -0.15 0.37 -0.05 0.06 -0.46
1.3 0.33 -0.08 -0.29 0.07 -0.10 0.05
2.1.1 -0.04 0.14 0.14 -0.14 0.04 -0.28
2.1.2 0.17 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 0.01
2.1.3 0.38 -0.40 -0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.06
2.2 -0.26 0.09 -0.06 0.10 0.01 0.37
2.3 0.37 -0.35 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 -0.09
2.4 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05
3.1.2 0.31 0.11 -0.51 0.08 -0.04 0.17
3.2.1 0.33 -0.17 -0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.15
3.2.2 0.02 0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.03 0.12
3.4.1 0.04 -0.11 0.07 0.10 0.14 -0.25
3.4.2 -0.40 0.16 -0.11 0.29 -0.16 0.72
3.4.3 0.15 -0.09 -0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.19
3.4.4 -0.22 0.20 -0.19 0.04 0.16 0.25
3.5 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.12 0.08
3.6 -0.03 0.05 -0.18 0.10 -0.04 0.28
3.7 -0.37 0.12 0.34 -0.17 -0.06 0.10
3.8 -0.04 0.09 -0.23 0.10 -0.05 0.34
4.2 -0.14 0.20 0.02 -0.15 -0.08 0.14
4.3 0.15 -0.20 0.05 0.09 0.12 -0.28
4.4 -0.28 0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.28
4.6 0.16 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09
4.7 0.15 0.02 -0.18 0.06 0.06 -0.06
4.8.1 -0.35 0.03 0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.50
5.1 -0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.14 0.28 -0.10
5.2 0.13 -0.07 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 -0.01
6.1 0.47 -0.17 0.00 -0.12 0.01 -0.55
6.2 0.23 0.03 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 -0.22
6.3 -0.53 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.60
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Appendix B: Elements 1.0 & 2.0 Sub-Elements Correlation Table 
 
 
1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.2 2.3 2.4
1 -0.17 0.00 0.33 -0.04 0.17 0.38 -0.26 0.37 0.13
2 0.21 -0.15 -0.08 0.14 -0.05 -0.40 0.09 -0.35 -0.03
3 -0.18 0.37 -0.29 0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02
4 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.14 -0.07
5 0.00 0.06 -0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.07
6 0.32 -0.46 0.05 -0.28 0.01 -0.06 0.37 -0.09 -0.05
1.1 1.00 -0.77 -0.26 -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 0.34 0.01 0.13
1.2 -0.77 1.00 -0.32 0.30 0.14 -0.04 -0.31 -0.12 -0.15
1.3 -0.26 -0.32 1.00 -0.09 -0.04 0.33 -0.05 0.20 0.05
2.1.1 -0.25 0.30 -0.09 1.00 -0.19 -0.40 -0.82 -0.32 -0.16
2.1.2 -0.11 0.14 -0.04 -0.19 1.00 0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.08
2.1.3 -0.16 -0.04 0.33 -0.40 0.09 1.00 0.01 0.44 -0.02
2.2 0.34 -0.31 -0.05 -0.82 -0.14 0.01 1.00 -0.04 0.00
2.3 0.01 -0.12 0.20 -0.32 -0.18 0.44 -0.04 1.00 0.14
2.4 0.13 -0.15 0.05 -0.16 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.14 1.00
3.1.2 -0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.15 0.25 0.15 0.02 0.08 -0.10
3.2.1 -0.37 0.31 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.11 -0.29 0.00 -0.08
3.2.2 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.14 -0.02 -0.03
3.4.1 -0.19 0.17 0.05 0.37 -0.11 -0.16 -0.33 0.00 -0.09
3.4.2 0.34 -0.35 0.04 -0.22 0.08 -0.12 0.31 -0.15 -0.09
3.4.3 -0.12 0.09 0.06 0.17 -0.13 0.04 -0.24 0.24 -0.01
3.4.4 0.10 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.16 -0.13 -0.09
3.5 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.04
3.6 0.07 -0.23 0.25 -0.13 -0.01 0.06 0.17 -0.07 -0.05
3.7 0.38 -0.27 -0.14 -0.24 -0.18 -0.07 0.36 -0.07 0.16
3.8 0.10 -0.26 0.24 -0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.15 -0.06 -0.06
4.2 0.17 -0.22 0.06 -0.26 -0.08 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.15
4.3 -0.38 0.41 -0.06 0.28 0.16 -0.08 -0.30 -0.13 -0.08
4.4 0.27 -0.20 -0.08 -0.22 0.01 -0.06 0.28 -0.03 -0.09
4.6 0.01 0.10 -0.16 0.06 0.02 0.11 -0.13 0.10 -0.02
4.7 0.02 -0.15 0.20 0.08 -0.16 0.08 -0.08 0.15 -0.10
4.8.1 0.24 -0.20 -0.04 -0.14 0.04 -0.08 0.22 -0.13 -0.07
5.1 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.15 -0.11 0.06 -0.16 0.06 -0.03
5.2 0.08 0.04 -0.17 -0.07 0.16 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.04
6.1 -0.45 0.26 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.18 -0.34 0.15 0.04
6.2 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 0.10 0.08 0.16 -0.07
6.3 0.43 -0.25 -0.24 -0.15 -0.06 -0.20 0.31 -0.20 -0.01
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Appendix C: Element 3.0 Sub-Elements Correlation Table 
 
 
3.1.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8
1 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.04 -0.40 0.15 -0.22 -0.07 -0.03 -0.37 -0.04
2 0.11 -0.17 0.13 -0.11 0.16 -0.09 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.09
3 -0.51 -0.16 -0.16 0.07 -0.11 -0.03 -0.19 -0.10 -0.18 0.34 -0.23
4 0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.29 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.10 -0.17 0.10
5 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.16 0.02 0.16 0.12 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
6 0.17 -0.15 0.12 -0.25 0.72 -0.19 0.25 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.34
1.1 -0.11 -0.37 0.08 -0.19 0.34 -0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.38 0.10
1.2 0.04 0.31 -0.03 0.17 -0.35 0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.23 -0.27 -0.26
1.3 0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.25 -0.14 0.24
2.1.1 -0.15 0.16 -0.12 0.37 -0.22 0.17 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.24 -0.12
2.1.2 0.25 0.25 0.04 -0.11 0.08 -0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01
2.1.3 0.15 0.11 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.08
2.2 0.02 -0.29 0.14 -0.33 0.31 -0.24 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.36 0.15
2.3 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 0.24 -0.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06
2.4 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.06
3.1.2 1.00 0.24 0.24 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.26 0.08 -0.05 -0.46 -0.03
3.2.1 0.24 1.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.14 -0.73 -0.14
3.2.2 0.24 -0.07 1.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.04
3.4.1 -0.17 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 -0.18 0.32 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.47 -0.15
3.4.2 0.00 -0.18 0.05 -0.18 1.00 -0.15 0.13 0.04 0.34 0.13 0.41
3.4.3 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.32 -0.15 1.00 -0.11 0.02 -0.12 -0.36 -0.12
3.4.4 0.26 0.09 0.08 -0.11 0.13 -0.11 1.00 0.19 0.01 -0.14 0.02
3.5 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.19 1.00 0.02 -0.09 0.01
3.6 -0.05 -0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.34 -0.12 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.84
3.7 -0.46 -0.73 -0.03 -0.47 0.13 -0.36 -0.14 -0.09 0.01 1.00 0.02
3.8 -0.03 -0.14 0.04 -0.15 0.41 -0.12 0.02 0.01 0.84 0.02 1.00
4.2 -0.10 -0.21 -0.01 -0.32 0.10 -0.26 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.38 0.13
4.3 0.15 0.31 0.05 0.37 -0.28 0.20 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 -0.45 -0.22
4.4 -0.15 -0.29 0.05 -0.26 0.36 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.39 0.12
4.6 0.04 0.18 -0.08 0.07 -0.12 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09
4.7 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.10 -0.13 0.08
4.8.1 -0.10 -0.23 0.06 -0.21 0.58 -0.19 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.28 0.22
5.1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.07 -0.03
5.2 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.20 -0.02
6.1 -0.07 0.19 -0.10 0.27 -0.51 0.26 -0.33 -0.10 -0.16 -0.22 -0.22
6.2 0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
6.3 0.02 -0.17 0.10 -0.25 0.54 -0.24 0.35 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.22
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Appendix D: Element 4.0, 5.0 & 6.0 Sub-Elements Correlation Table 
 
 
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.8.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3
1 -0.14 0.15 -0.28 0.16 0.15 -0.35 -0.02 0.13 0.47 0.23 -0.53
2 0.20 -0.20 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.17 0.03 0.16
3 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.06 -0.18 0.07 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.03
4 -0.15 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.12 -0.14 0.16 -0.12 0.15 0.07
5 -0.08 0.12 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.28 -0.12 0.01 -0.09 0.02
6 0.14 -0.28 0.28 -0.09 -0.06 0.50 -0.10 -0.01 -0.55 -0.22 0.60
1.1 0.17 -0.38 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.08 -0.45 0.02 0.43
1.2 -0.22 0.41 -0.20 0.10 -0.15 -0.20 -0.04 0.04 0.26 0.00 -0.25
1.3 0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16 0.20 -0.04 0.11 -0.17 0.25 -0.01 -0.24
2.1.1 -0.26 0.28 -0.22 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.15 -0.07 0.18 -0.11 -0.15
2.1.2 -0.08 0.16 0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.04 -0.11 0.16 0.08 -0.06 -0.06
2.1.3 0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.18 0.10 -0.20
2.2 0.28 -0.30 0.28 -0.13 -0.08 0.22 -0.16 0.03 -0.34 0.08 0.31
2.3 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 0.10 0.15 -0.13 0.06 -0.01 0.15 0.16 -0.20
2.4 0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.01
3.1.2 -0.10 0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 0.18 0.02
3.2.1 -0.21 0.31 -0.29 0.18 0.02 -0.23 -0.05 0.12 0.19 -0.04 -0.17
3.2.2 -0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.10
3.4.1 -0.32 0.37 -0.26 0.07 0.06 -0.21 -0.01 0.13 0.27 -0.04 -0.25
3.4.2 0.10 -0.28 0.36 -0.12 -0.07 0.58 -0.18 0.05 -0.51 -0.15 0.54
3.4.3 -0.26 0.20 -0.18 0.05 0.17 -0.19 0.04 0.07 0.26 -0.03 -0.24
3.4.4 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.33 -0.11 0.35
3.5 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.19 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 0.12
3.6 0.09 -0.18 0.09 -0.09 0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 0.16
3.7 0.38 -0.45 0.39 -0.16 -0.13 0.28 0.07 -0.20 -0.22 0.00 0.22
3.8 0.13 -0.22 0.12 -0.09 0.08 0.22 -0.03 -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 0.22
4.2 1.00 -0.52 -0.01 -0.22 -0.11 0.01 0.14 -0.24 -0.14 0.02 0.13
4.3 -0.52 1.00 -0.35 -0.12 -0.38 -0.28 -0.09 0.12 0.26 -0.01 -0.25
4.4 -0.01 -0.35 1.00 -0.15 -0.15 0.36 -0.06 -0.01 -0.26 -0.01 0.26
4.6 -0.22 -0.12 -0.15 1.00 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 0.18 -0.02 0.04 0.01
4.7 -0.11 -0.38 -0.15 -0.13 1.00 -0.16 0.18 -0.10 0.13 0.03 -0.14
4.8.1 0.01 -0.28 0.36 -0.12 -0.16 1.00 -0.15 0.06 -0.40 -0.11 0.42
5.1 0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.18 -0.15 1.00 -0.66 0.06 -0.02 -0.05
5.2 -0.24 0.12 -0.01 0.18 -0.10 0.06 -0.66 1.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
6.1 -0.14 0.26 -0.26 -0.02 0.13 -0.40 0.06 0.01 1.00 -0.07 -0.96
6.2 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.22
6.3 0.13 -0.25 0.26 0.01 -0.14 0.42 -0.05 -0.01 -0.96 -0.22 1.00
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Appendix E: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Bomber Platforms 
  
1 Unit-Level Manpower 22.84% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.02%
1.1 Operations 19.73% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 69.26% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.88%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 11.02% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.95% 4 Sustaining Support 3.91%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 79.15% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 5.20%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 2.88% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 83.97%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 4.33% 4.4 Program Management 0.49%
2.2 Support Services 10.62% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.99%
2.3 TDY 2.38% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.26%
2.4 Transportaion 0.65% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.09%
3 Maintenance 38.07% 5 Continuing System Improvements 16.88%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 11.78% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 44.95%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 62.20% 5.2 Software Maintenance 55.05%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.06% 6 Indirect Support 1.35%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 20.21% 6.1 Installation Support 74.66%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 6.29%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.62% 6.3 General Training & Education 19.05%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.24%
1996-2016B-1B
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 22.13% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.03%
1.1 Operations 17.42% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 2.22%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 61.66% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 23.55%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 20.92% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.17%
2 Unit Operations 11.09% 4 Sustaining Support 7.74%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 40.05% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 1.77%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 4.27% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 86.04%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.78% 4.4 Program Management 0.17%
2.2 Support Services 44.50% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 6.45%
2.3 TDY 3.17% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.08%
2.4 Transportaion 1.22% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 5.49%
3 Maintenance 34.02% 5 Continuing System Improvements 22.68%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 6.27% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 43.05%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 21.98% 5.2 Software Maintenance 56.95%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.06% 6 Indirect Support 2.33%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 40.91% 6.1 Installation Support 80.54%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.78%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.73% 6.3 General Training & Education 14.68%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.09%
1996-2016B-2A
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 32.59% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.11%
1.1 Operations 23.40% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.04%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 55.15% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.08%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 21.45% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.46% 4 Sustaining Support 3.23%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 79.26% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 2.80%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 6.30% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 84.58%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 4.92% 4.4 Program Management 0.39%
2.2 Support Services 5.72% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 6.85%
2.3 TDY 1.66% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 3.93%
2.4 Transportaion 2.13% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 1.44%
3 Maintenance 35.76% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.62%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 6.11% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 51.62%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 33.11% 5.2 Software Maintenance 48.38%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.21% 6 Indirect Support 2.34%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 42.51% 6.1 Installation Support 79.10%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.77%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 14.63% 6.3 General Training & Education 17.12%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.21%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1996-2016B-52H
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Appendix F: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Fighter Platforms 
 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 37.05% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.93%
1.1 Operations 15.13% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 61.17% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 0.97%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 23.70% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 18.37% 4 Sustaining Support 1.98%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 48.90% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 21.92%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 28.85% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 69.06%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.29% 4.4 Program Management 0.21%
2.2 Support Services 8.61% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 3.78%
2.3 TDY 5.92% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 5.01%
2.4 Transportaion 0.42% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.02%
3 Maintenance 29.30% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.97%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 17.52% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 74.37%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 55.64% 5.2 Software Maintenance 25.63%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.06% 6 Indirect Support 4.33%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 23.14% 6.1 Installation Support 82.11%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 6.10%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.71% 6.3 General Training & Education 11.79%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.33%
A-10A 1996-2011
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 38.36% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.06%
1.1 Operations 25.84% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.01%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 55.92% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.43%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 18.24% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 21.08% 4 Sustaining Support 2.28%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 46.65% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 1.96%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 33.57% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 81.08%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.77% 4.4 Program Management 2.59%
2.2 Support Services 6.66% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 5.85%
2.3 TDY 5.06% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 3.85%
2.4 Transportaion 1.30% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 4.68%
3 Maintenance 26.52% 5 Continuing System Improvements 7.40%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 16.86% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 68.55%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 51.74% 5.2 Software Maintenance 31.45%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.02% 6 Indirect Support 4.36%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 22.83% 6.1 Installation Support 83.52%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.09%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.23% 6.3 General Training & Education 13.38%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.88%
A-10C 2008-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 34.39% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.14%
1.1 Operations 6.33% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 65.97% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 5.56%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 27.70% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.45% 4 Sustaining Support 2.25%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 72.11% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 12.16%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 4.29% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 87.15%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.89% 4.4 Program Management 0.13%
2.2 Support Services 6.29% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.40%
2.3 TDY 8.42% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.15%
2.4 Transportaion 1.00% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.01%
3 Maintenance 38.85% 5 Continuing System Improvements 1.77%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 10.88% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 94.65%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 65.86% 5.2 Software Maintenance 5.35%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.18% 6 Indirect Support 5.29%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 12.98% 6.1 Installation Support 95.08%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.25%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.12% 6.3 General Training & Education 2.67%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.33%
F-15A 1996-2010
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 35.20% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.15%
1.1 Operations 5.88% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 67.72% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 7.13%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 26.41% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 18.16% 4 Sustaining Support 2.35%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 70.66% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 13.70%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 6.91% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 85.14%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.12% 4.4 Program Management 0.60%
2.2 Support Services 6.01% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.55%
2.3 TDY 8.29% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.00%
2.4 Transportaion 1.01% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.01%
3 Maintenance 36.47% 5 Continuing System Improvements 2.32%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.98% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 93.80%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 62.10% 5.2 Software Maintenance 6.20%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.21% 6 Indirect Support 5.51%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 15.30% 6.1 Installation Support 95.53%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.01%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.79% 6.3 General Training & Education 2.47%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.35%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
F-15B 1996-2009
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 28.62% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.03%
1.1 Operations 12.68% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 74.06% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 5.33%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 13.26% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.00% 4 Sustaining Support 2.02%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 75.82% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 8.00%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 4.52% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 79.44%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.21% 4.4 Program Management 0.92%
2.2 Support Services 10.42% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 11.18%
2.3 TDY 3.34% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.00%
2.4 Transportaion 0.69% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.46%
3 Maintenance 41.82% 5 Continuing System Improvements 9.00%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.13% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 97.21%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 61.09% 5.2 Software Maintenance 2.79%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.03% 6 Indirect Support 2.54%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 21.28% 6.1 Installation Support 75.68%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 5.41%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.62% 6.3 General Training & Education 18.91%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.57%
F-15C 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 29.55% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 18.08% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 73.05% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.88%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 8.87% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 19.88% 4 Sustaining Support 0.97%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 78.51% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 26.23%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 10.31% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 45.27%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 4.14% 4.4 Program Management 1.33%
2.2 Support Services 3.27% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 24.11%
2.3 TDY 3.36% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.47%
2.4 Transportaion 0.41% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.58%
3 Maintenance 40.73% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.34%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 10.80% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 85.05%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 68.80% 5.2 Software Maintenance 14.95%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.07% 6 Indirect Support 2.53%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 16.38% 6.1 Installation Support 46.29%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 5.65%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.86% 6.3 General Training & Education 48.06%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.26%
F-15E 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 26.90% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.03%
1.1 Operations 12.35% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 71.79% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 5.27%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.86% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.04% 4 Sustaining Support 1.78%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 71.36% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 11.17%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 5.50% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 77.59%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.16% 4.4 Program Management 1.22%
2.2 Support Services 14.50% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.41%
2.3 TDY 3.00% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.08%
2.4 Transportaion 0.48% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.52%
3 Maintenance 42.99% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.33%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.27% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 96.73%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 59.92% 5.2 Software Maintenance 3.27%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.03% 6 Indirect Support 2.96%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 22.78% 6.1 Installation Support 74.18%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.79%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.21% 6.3 General Training & Education 22.03%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.54%
F-15D 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 29.55% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 18.08% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 73.05% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.88%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 8.87% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 19.88% 4 Sustaining Support 0.97%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 78.51% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 26.23%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 10.31% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 45.27%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 4.14% 4.4 Program Management 1.33%
2.2 Support Services 3.27% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 24.11%
2.3 TDY 3.36% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.47%
2.4 Transportaion 0.41% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.58%
3 Maintenance 40.73% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.34%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 10.80% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 85.05%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 68.80% 5.2 Software Maintenance 14.95%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.07% 6 Indirect Support 2.53%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 16.38% 6.1 Installation Support 46.29%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 5.65%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.86% 6.3 General Training & Education 48.06%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.26%
F-15E 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
102 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 44.55% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.69%
1.1 Operations 5.43% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 49.84% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.59%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 44.73% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.33% 4 Sustaining Support 2.33%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 50.63% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 21.45%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 7.09% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 58.33%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 8.11% 4.4 Program Management 0.63%
2.2 Support Services 19.58% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 13.13% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 19.58%
2.4 Transportaion 1.47% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.01%
3 Maintenance 28.27% 5 Continuing System Improvements 3.52%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 15.34% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 94.27%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 63.22% 5.2 Software Maintenance 5.73%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.29% 6 Indirect Support 5.00%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 5.18% 6.1 Installation Support 92.57%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.80%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 9.70% 6.3 General Training & Education 4.63%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.09%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
F-16A 1996-2007
1 Unit-Level Manpower 35.73% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.61%
1.1 Operations 6.28% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 59.66% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.46%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 34.05% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 20.70% 4 Sustaining Support 2.54%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 62.01% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 28.56%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 4.33% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 45.57%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.67% 4.4 Program Management 2.32%
2.2 Support Services 20.11% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 6.97% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 23.53%
2.4 Transportaion 0.91% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.01%
3 Maintenance 32.93% 5 Continuing System Improvements 4.79%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 13.17% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 97.72%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 65.74% 5.2 Software Maintenance 2.28%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.28% 6 Indirect Support 3.31%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 9.35% 6.1 Installation Support 91.46%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.00%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 6.81% 6.3 General Training & Education 5.54%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.66%
F-16B 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.67% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.20%
1.1 Operations 10.88% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.02%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 67.50% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.34%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 21.63% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 18.58% 4 Sustaining Support 1.42%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 60.38% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 15.03%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 14.71% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 54.21%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.62% 4.4 Program Management 1.27%
2.2 Support Services 9.96% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 8.99%
2.3 TDY 6.12% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 15.67%
2.4 Transportaion 2.21% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 4.83%
3 Maintenance 27.99% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.84%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 17.74% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 77.58%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 65.51% 5.2 Software Maintenance 22.42%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.11% 6 Indirect Support 4.51%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.70% 6.1 Installation Support 82.43%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.95%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.42% 6.3 General Training & Education 13.62%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.97%
F-16C 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 39.75% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.12%
1.1 Operations 11.71% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.02%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 71.28% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.56%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 17.01% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 19.44% 4 Sustaining Support 1.36%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 55.90% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 17.24%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 19.42% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 49.77%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.48% 4.4 Program Management 2.54%
2.2 Support Services 11.60% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.50%
2.3 TDY 5.05% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 17.97%
2.4 Transportaion 1.55% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.96%
3 Maintenance 27.69% 5 Continuing System Improvements 7.56%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 15.99% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 78.59%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 67.16% 5.2 Software Maintenance 21.41%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.09% 6 Indirect Support 4.20%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 5.63% 6.1 Installation Support 74.31%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.56%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 6.38% 6.3 General Training & Education 22.14%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.05%
F-16D 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 28.55% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 26.42% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 66.03% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 99.45%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 7.55% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 9.71% 4 Sustaining Support 0.96%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 53.65% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 0.00%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.44% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 41.47%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 12.55% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 25.67% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 18.28%
2.3 TDY 7.22% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.12%
2.4 Transportaion 0.47% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 40.14%
3 Maintenance 37.65% 5 Continuing System Improvements 15.42%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.21% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 78.92%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 21.08%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.00% 6 Indirect Support 7.71%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.01% 6.1 Installation Support 70.55%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.77%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.03% 6.3 General Training & Education 26.67%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.29%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
F-35A 2012-2016
1 Unit-Level Manpower 20.24% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 10.77% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.01%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 76.25% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 97.48%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 12.99% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 20.23% 4 Sustaining Support 0.21%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 56.52% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 32.84%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 3.42% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 25.13%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.41% 4.4 Program Management 4.28%
2.2 Support Services 29.05% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 21.51%
2.3 TDY 4.04% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 9.57%
2.4 Transportaion 0.55% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 6.67%
3 Maintenance 42.04% 5 Continuing System Improvements 14.90%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 1.95% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.78%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.19% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.22%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.05% 6 Indirect Support 2.38%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.14% 6.1 Installation Support 69.83%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.07%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.01% 6.3 General Training & Education 26.10%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.18%
F-22A 2003-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 20.38% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 15.32% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 69.12% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 98.59%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.56% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 10.98% 4 Sustaining Support 0.21%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 38.51% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 0.00%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.38% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 86.76%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.02% 4.4 Program Management 4.90%
2.2 Support Services 45.21% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 4.58% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 8.33%
2.4 Transportaion 2.30% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 59.52% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.53%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 1.07% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.98%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.02%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.27% 6 Indirect Support 2.38%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 75.32%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.35%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 20.33%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.08%
F-117A 1996-2008
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 60.12% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 35.31% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 45.57% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.96%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 19.11% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 19.83% 4 Sustaining Support 0.61%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 37.81% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 0.00%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 28.79% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 78.37%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 14.44% 4.4 Program Management 1.52%
2.2 Support Services 10.27% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 11.37%
2.3 TDY 8.30% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 8.55%
2.4 Transportaion 0.39% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.19%
3 Maintenance 7.61% 5 Continuing System Improvements 5.78%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 90.73% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 69.66%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 30.34%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 2.74% 6 Indirect Support 6.05%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 88.05%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 5.89%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.65% 6.3 General Training & Education 6.06%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.05%
OA-10A 1996-2008
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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Appendix G: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Reconnaissance 
Platforms  
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.10% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.01%
1.1 Operations 47.38% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 39.44% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.06%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 13.18% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.71% 4 Sustaining Support 3.31%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 70.20% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 5.20%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
83.97%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.66% 4.4 Program Management 0.49%
2.2 Support Services 16.35% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.99%
2.3 TDY 9.50% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.26%
2.4 Transportaion 0.29% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.09%
3 Maintenance 26.32% 5 Continuing System Improvements 11.57%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 10.66% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 61.82%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 36.97% 5.2 Software Maintenance 38.18%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.00% 6 Indirect Support 1.99%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 35.15% 6.1 Installation Support 63.51%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 9.98%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.16% 6.3 General Training & Education 26.52%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.02%
E-3B 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 41.14% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.02%
1.1 Operations 47.94% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 39.50% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.36%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 12.56% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.17% 4 Sustaining Support 3.31%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 71.61% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 5.20%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
83.97%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.55% 4.4 Program Management 0.49%
2.2 Support Services 15.31% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.99%
2.3 TDY 9.23% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.26%
2.4 Transportaion 0.30% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.09%
3 Maintenance 25.52% 5 Continuing System Improvements 11.90%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.06% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 44.95%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 39.70% 5.2 Software Maintenance 55.05%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.00% 6 Indirect Support 1.96%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 32.43% 6.1 Installation Support 74.66%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 6.29%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 14.40% 6.3 General Training & Education 19.05%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.03%
E-3C 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 28.14% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 38.51% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.11%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 42.36% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 82.73%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 19.14% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 14.05% 4 Sustaining Support 0.24%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 61.98% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 46.56%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
45.77%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.42% 4.4 Program Management 6.25%
2.2 Support Services 20.01% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 1.41%
2.3 TDY 9.30% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.00%
2.4 Transportaion 1.29% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 43.12% 5 Continuing System Improvements 9.94%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 3.22% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 97.53%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 6.47% 5.2 Software Maintenance 2.47%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.05% 6 Indirect Support 4.51%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 54.18%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.31%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 6.36% 6.3 General Training & Education 42.51%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.06%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
E-8C 1996-2016
1 Unit-Level Manpower 17.95% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 10.24% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 73.11% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 98.56%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 16.65% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 9.60% 4 Sustaining Support 0.11%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 34.79% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 5.20%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
83.97%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.06% 4.4 Program Management 0.49%
2.2 Support Services 38.00% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.99%
2.3 TDY 16.56% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.26%
2.4 Transportaion 1.59% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.09%
3 Maintenance 67.15% 5 Continuing System Improvements 2.58%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.71% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 90.87%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.39% 5.2 Software Maintenance 9.13%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.28% 6 Indirect Support 2.61%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 56.97%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 6.93%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 36.10%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.07%
U-2S 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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Appendix H: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Special Duty Platforms 
 
 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 33.92% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.20%
1.1 Operations 40.91% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 42.80% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 64.57%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 16.29% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 11.42% 4 Sustaining Support 0.46%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 51.12% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 7.82%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 1.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 46.39%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.59% 4.4 Program Management 38.09%
2.2 Support Services 25.95% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.41%
2.3 TDY 13.90% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.00%
2.4 Transportaion 1.44% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 7.29%
3 Maintenance 35.45% 5 Continuing System Improvements 15.12%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 7.07% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 92.67%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 17.25% 5.2 Software Maintenance 7.33%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 2.12% 6 Indirect Support 3.63%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.09% 6.1 Installation Support 42.71%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 9.91%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 6.70% 6.3 General Training & Education 47.37%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
EC-130H 1996-2009
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 44.27% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 19.13% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 44.94% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 0.97%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 35.93% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 13.54% 4 Sustaining Support 0.75%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 48.75% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 25.88%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.04% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 29.70%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 19.37% 4.4 Program Management 7.03%
2.2 Support Services 13.44% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 3.11%
2.3 TDY 17.64% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 28.67%
2.4 Transportaion 0.77% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 5.60%
3 Maintenance 22.42% 5 Continuing System Improvements 12.31%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 22.18% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 93.27%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 71.54% 5.2 Software Maintenance 6.73%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.07% 6 Indirect Support 6.70%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.24% 6.1 Installation Support 84.38%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.21%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 12.41%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.10%
MC-130E 1996-2013
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.78% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.04%
1.1 Operations 39.65% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 41.75% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 2.11%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 18.61% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 14.01% 4 Sustaining Support 0.92%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 43.39% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 9.04%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.54% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 23.49%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.99% 4.4 Program Management 1.30%
2.2 Support Services 29.71% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 50.98%
2.3 TDY 15.51% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 15.13%
2.4 Transportaion 0.86% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.07%
3 Maintenance 27.90% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.79%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 17.09% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 60.14%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 57.37% 5.2 Software Maintenance 39.86%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.07% 6 Indirect Support 7.60%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.49% 6.1 Installation Support 62.73%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 8.64%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 9.40% 6.3 General Training & Education 28.63%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.46%
MC-130H 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 44.28% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.08%
1.1 Operations 34.42% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 45.44% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.01%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 20.14% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 14.52% 4 Sustaining Support 1.06%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 45.48% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 9.92%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.35% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 20.73%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.30% 4.4 Program Management 1.07%
2.2 Support Services 29.15% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 50.06%
2.3 TDY 14.92% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 16.59%
2.4 Transportaion 0.79% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 1.63%
3 Maintenance 22.12% 5 Continuing System Improvements 10.53%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 18.29% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 60.72%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 48.51% 5.2 Software Maintenance 39.28%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.24% 6 Indirect Support 7.50%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 17.73% 6.1 Installation Support 70.44%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 7.31%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.51% 6.3 General Training & Education 22.25%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.63%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
MC-130P 1996-2016
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 41.73% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.02%
1.1 Operations 41.48% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.13%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 42.67% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 22.44%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.86% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.13%
2 Unit Operations 15.46% 4 Sustaining Support 0.58%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 33.37% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 9.67%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 16.65% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 52.37%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.72% 4.4 Program Management 3.37%
2.2 Support Services 26.60% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 24.83%
2.3 TDY 12.75% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 9.67%
2.4 Transportaion 0.90% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.09%
3 Maintenance 26.71% 5 Continuing System Improvements 9.04%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 21.66% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 58.25%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 55.34% 5.2 Software Maintenance 41.75%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.02% 6 Indirect Support 6.48%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 63.26%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 8.36%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 28.39%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.44%
AC-130U 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 50.10% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.68%
1.1 Operations 33.48% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 3.13%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 42.41% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 10.18%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 24.10% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 3.13%
2 Unit Operations 21.12% 4 Sustaining Support 1.50%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 60.68% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 35.45%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 26.99%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.24% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 15.82% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 2.07%
2.3 TDY 16.30% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 35.45%
2.4 Transportaion 0.95% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.05%
3 Maintenance 16.77% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.08%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 27.89% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 83.73%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 53.30% 5.2 Software Maintenance 16.27%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 1.60% 6 Indirect Support 4.44%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 89.30%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 7.69%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 3.01%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.09%
EC-130E 1996-2002
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.69% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.06%
1.1 Operations 16.57% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 1.95%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 44.94% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 8.22%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 38.50% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 1.95%
2 Unit Operations 18.43% 4 Sustaining Support 1.20%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 54.41% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 34.53%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.04% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 30.52%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 9.91% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 26.08% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.42%
2.3 TDY 7.99% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 34.53%
2.4 Transportaion 1.58% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 18.52% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.11%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 28.47% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 96.62%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 59.27% 5.2 Software Maintenance 3.38%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.05% 6 Indirect Support 13.04%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 89.02%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.26%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 7.71%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.03%
WC-130H 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 55.65% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.05%
1.1 Operations 16.91% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 14.56%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 40.03% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 39.29%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 43.06% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 14.56%
2 Unit Operations 19.67% 4 Sustaining Support 0.76%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 58.43% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 50.00%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.02% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 0.00%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 15.41% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 19.33% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 6.32% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 50.00%
2.4 Transportaion 0.50% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 12.32% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.45%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 14.21% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.91%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 17.19% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.09%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.14% 6 Indirect Support 5.15%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 71.41%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 20.25%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 8.34%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
WC-130J 1996-2016
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Appendix I: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Trainer Platforms 
 
 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 14.45% 3.5 Other Maintenance 1.50%
1.1 Operations 31.01% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 53.72% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 8.08%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.26% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 30.91% 4 Sustaining Support 1.86%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 47.10% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 31.75%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
46.03%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 2.85% 4.4 Program Management 3.32%
2.2 Support Services 45.98% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 4.21%
2.3 TDY 3.90% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 14.27%
2.4 Transportaion 0.17% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.43%
3 Maintenance 26.91% 5 Continuing System Improvements 10.70%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 41.81% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 92.63%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 40.04% 5.2 Software Maintenance 7.37%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 1.05% 6 Indirect Support 15.17%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 4.28% 6.1 Installation Support 14.10%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 10.86%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.11% 6.3 General Training & Education 75.05%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.13%
T-38A 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 11.28% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.90%
1.1 Operations 37.06% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 46.74% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 33.57%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 16.20% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 26.22% 4 Sustaining Support 2.21%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 46.66% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 31.77%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.00%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
42.67%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 2.85% 4.4 Program Management 0.05%
2.2 Support Services 47.98% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 5.19%
2.3 TDY 2.21% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 19.45%
2.4 Transportaion 0.30% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.87%
3 Maintenance 30.03% 5 Continuing System Improvements 11.40%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 30.39% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 91.12%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 28.37% 5.2 Software Maintenance 8.88%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.13% 6 Indirect Support 18.86%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.56% 6.1 Installation Support 20.58%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 1.84%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.11% 6.3 General Training & Education 77.58%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 3.98%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
T-38C 1996-2016
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 10.13% 3.5 Other Maintenance 4.56%
1.1 Operations 42.13% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 1.18%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 47.67% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 14.38%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 10.20% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 1.18%
2 Unit Operations 32.85% 4 Sustaining Support 1.72%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 50.57% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 11.66%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
0.63%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
30.91%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.33% 4.4 Program Management 11.66%
2.2 Support Services 42.69% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 1.41%
2.3 TDY 2.70% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 32.68%
2.4 Transportaion 0.07% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 11.66%
3 Maintenance 17.62% 5 Continuing System Improvements 23.30%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 20.86% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.35%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 36.34% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.65%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 2.13% 6 Indirect Support 14.38%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 10.82% 6.1 Installation Support 10.94%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 1.18% 6.2 Personnel Support 0.11%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.30% 6.3 General Training & Education 88.95%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.09%
AT-38B 1996-2006
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 6.70% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 63.82% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 2.72%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 10.30% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 91.07%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 25.88% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 2.72%
2 Unit Operations 26.02% 4 Sustaining Support 2.92%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 56.29% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 31.44%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
3.41%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
0.01%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.53% 4.4 Program Management 31.44%
2.2 Support Services 33.79% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.06%
2.3 TDY 2.89% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 5.61%
2.4 Transportaion 0.09% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 31.44%
3 Maintenance 32.89% 5 Continuing System Improvements 1.05%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.14% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 74.34%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 25.66%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.33% 6 Indirect Support 30.42%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.12% 6.1 Installation Support 14.41%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.72% 6.2 Personnel Support 0.67%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 84.92%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.18%
T-1A 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 10.35% 3.5 Other Maintenance 1.54%
1.1 Operations 34.29% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 7.14%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 52.41% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 1.18%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 13.30% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 7.14%
2 Unit Operations 29.18% 4 Sustaining Support 5.62%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 31.61% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 29.83%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
5.93%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
2.93%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.70% 4.4 Program Management 29.83%
2.2 Support Services 55.09% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.56%
2.3 TDY 3.58% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 7.03%
2.4 Transportaion 0.08% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 29.83%
3 Maintenance 24.02% 5 Continuing System Improvements 0.02%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 37.74% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 0.00%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 34.50% 5.2 Software Maintenance 100.00%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.97% 6 Indirect Support 30.81%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.13% 6.1 Installation Support 16.69%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.14% 6.2 Personnel Support 0.09%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.05% 6.3 General Training & Education 83.22%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 2.46%
T-37B 1996-2009
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 8.15% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 61.53% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 7.82%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 9.96% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 75.58%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 28.51% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 7.82%
2 Unit Operations 21.66% 4 Sustaining Support 6.70%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 25.68% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 31.86%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores
9.92%
4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering
0.00%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.08% 4.4 Program Management 31.86%
2.2 Support Services 55.17% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.05%
2.3 TDY 4.04% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 4.36%
2.4 Transportaion 0.11% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 31.86%
3 Maintenance 27.49% 5 Continuing System Improvements 3.23%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.57% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.86%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.01% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.14%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.09% 6 Indirect Support 32.77%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 9.88%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.82% 6.2 Personnel Support 1.37%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 88.75%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.30%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
T-6A 2001-2016
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Appendix J: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for Transport Platforms 
 
 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 39.11% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.38%
1.1 Operations 25.71% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 51.34% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.11%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 22.95% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.94% 4 Sustaining Support 7.02%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 44.40% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 8.93%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.05% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 42.87%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 13.90% 4.4 Program Management 0.21%
2.2 Support Services 14.12% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 29.09%
2.3 TDY 21.00% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 18.43%
2.4 Transportaion 6.53% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.46%
3 Maintenance 24.95% 5 Continuing System Improvements 4.51%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 20.02% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 95.28%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 44.05% 5.2 Software Maintenance 4.72%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.09% 6 Indirect Support 6.48%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.13% 6.1 Installation Support 60.49%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 8.90%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 18.15% 6.3 General Training & Education 30.61%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.07%
C-130E 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.38% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.23%
1.1 Operations 22.53% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 43.15% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 8.07%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 34.32% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 19.08% 4 Sustaining Support 1.29%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 58.04% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 12.08%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.32% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 50.61%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.24% 4.4 Program Management 1.19%
2.2 Support Services 18.15% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 9.79%
2.3 TDY 13.27% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 25.33%
2.4 Transportaion 2.98% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 1.00%
3 Maintenance 27.45% 5 Continuing System Improvements 5.50%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 17.73% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.08%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 39.17% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.92%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.17% 6 Indirect Support 6.30%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 21.40% 6.1 Installation Support 88.86%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.85%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.19% 6.3 General Training & Education 6.29%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.04%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
C-130H 1996-2016
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.20% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.31%
1.1 Operations 19.60% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 3.71%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 45.86% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 50.32%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 34.54% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 16.86% 4 Sustaining Support 1.35%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 61.70% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 18.32%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.12% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 37.96%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.31% 4.4 Program Management 0.07%
2.2 Support Services 19.20% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 21.04%
2.3 TDY 9.00% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 22.55%
2.4 Transportaion 2.67% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.06%
3 Maintenance 24.55% 5 Continuing System Improvements 10.59%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 10.46% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 89.68%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 17.05% 5.2 Software Maintenance 10.32%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.09% 6 Indirect Support 6.46%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 17.87% 6.1 Installation Support 65.07%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 4.62%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.01% 6.3 General Training & Education 30.31%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.18%
C-130J 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 23.24% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 32.36% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.01%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 55.05% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 81.46%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 12.58% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 38.42% 4 Sustaining Support 0.12%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 87.43% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 51.66%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.03% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 14.87%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 2.29% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 5.92% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 20.31%
2.3 TDY 4.28% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 13.17%
2.4 Transportaion 0.05% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 27.47% 5 Continuing System Improvements 8.24%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.81% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 96.23%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 7.55% 5.2 Software Maintenance 3.77%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 1.07% 6 Indirect Support 2.51%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.08% 6.1 Installation Support 69.13%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.79%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 28.09%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.01%
C-17A 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 36.46% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 59.84% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 18.75% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 98.44%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 21.41% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 25.14% 4 Sustaining Support 0.44%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 34.63% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 99.69%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 0.00%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.34% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 34.07% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.01%
2.3 TDY 12.48% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.30%
2.4 Transportaion 15.47% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 28.20% 5 Continuing System Improvements 3.36%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.91% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 78.68%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.16% 5.2 Software Maintenance 21.32%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.12% 6 Indirect Support 6.40%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.36% 6.1 Installation Support 70.54%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 1.29%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.02% 6.3 General Training & Education 28.17%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
C-21A 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 24.17% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.53%
1.1 Operations 13.24% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 59.53% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.50%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 27.23% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 17.74% 4 Sustaining Support 1.48%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 84.74% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 5.14%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 69.15%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.85% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 5.85% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 2.62%
2.3 TDY 5.28% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 23.10%
2.4 Transportaion 0.27% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 35.09% 5 Continuing System Improvements 17.39%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 13.54% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 96.84%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 30.30% 5.2 Software Maintenance 3.16%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.03% 6 Indirect Support 4.12%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 33.19% 6.1 Installation Support 87.68%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 1.40%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 18.90% 6.3 General Training & Education 10.92%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.02%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
C-5A 1996-2016
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 25.12% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.21%
1.1 Operations 22.53% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 62.97% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 6.75%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 14.50% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 21.18% 4 Sustaining Support 1.86%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 81.57% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 2.14%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.06% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 62.45%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.50% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 7.96% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 15.58%
2.3 TDY 6.58% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 19.83%
2.4 Transportaion 0.34% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 35.86% 5 Continuing System Improvements 13.39%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 13.67% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 86.56%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 36.35% 5.2 Software Maintenance 13.44%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.03% 6 Indirect Support 2.58%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 23.55% 6.1 Installation Support 84.69%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.08%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 19.44% 6.3 General Training & Education 12.22%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
C-5B 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 28.50% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.42%
1.1 Operations 25.44% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 63.21% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 9.34%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 11.35% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 15.13% 4 Sustaining Support 2.62%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 64.68% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 2.10%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.03% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 59.31%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 5.65% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 15.44% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 17.95%
2.3 TDY 13.22% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 20.64%
2.4 Transportaion 0.97% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 37.15% 5 Continuing System Improvements 12.78%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 5.95% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 80.42%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 18.48% 5.2 Software Maintenance 19.58%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.05% 6 Indirect Support 3.82%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 35.99% 6.1 Installation Support 82.96%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 0.79%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 29.77% 6.3 General Training & Education 16.24%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.01%
C-5C 1996-2015
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 38.82% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.29%
1.1 Operations 24.76% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 43.04% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 13.47%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 32.20% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 13.59% 4 Sustaining Support 1.13%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 55.84% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 13.45%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.52% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 54.11%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 12.96% 4.4 Program Management 0.31%
2.2 Support Services 18.64% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 6.68%
2.3 TDY 9.93% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 24.96%
2.4 Transportaion 2.11% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.49%
3 Maintenance 27.12% 5 Continuing System Improvements 12.22%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 20.46% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 98.35%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 39.63% 5.2 Software Maintenance 1.65%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.17% 6 Indirect Support 7.13%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 18.60% 6.1 Installation Support 64.12%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 5.38%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 7.20% 6.3 General Training & Education 30.51%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.17%
HC-130N 1996-2016
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 19.24% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 40.83% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 46.72% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 98.47%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 12.45% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 38.35% 4 Sustaining Support 1.72%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 95.25% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 17.22%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 1.53%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 0.95% 4.4 Program Management 29.85%
2.2 Support Services 0.54% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 3.25% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 48.50%
2.4 Transportaion 0.00% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 2.90%
3 Maintenance 36.10% 5 Continuing System Improvements 3.53%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.53% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.99%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.01%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.01% 6 Indirect Support 1.06%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.99% 6.1 Installation Support 86.62%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 11.58%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 1.80%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
KC-10A 1996-2016
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 40.12% 3.5 Other Maintenance 1.68%
1.1 Operations 8.24% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 54.47% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 4.86%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 37.29% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 18.32% 4 Sustaining Support 1.97%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 65.30% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 10.95%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 45.66%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 11.09% 4.4 Program Management 0.00%
2.2 Support Services 6.42% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.54%
2.3 TDY 16.70% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 42.86%
2.4 Transportaion 0.48% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 22.22% 5 Continuing System Improvements 11.38%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 16.74% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.96%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 13.90% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.04%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.23% 6 Indirect Support 5.99%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 33.54% 6.1 Installation Support 77.28%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 2.79%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 28.55% 6.3 General Training & Education 19.93%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.50%
KC-135D 1996-2007
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 37.39% 3.5 Other Maintenance 1.24%
1.1 Operations 11.34% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 44.01% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 3.69%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 44.65% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 18.15% 4 Sustaining Support 1.43%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 71.48% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 17.88%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 50.58%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.98% 4.4 Program Management 0.15%
2.2 Support Services 6.38% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.42%
2.3 TDY 13.62% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 30.98%
2.4 Transportaion 0.54% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.00%
3 Maintenance 25.78% 5 Continuing System Improvements 10.15%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 11.20% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 99.97%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 18.76% 5.2 Software Maintenance 0.03%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.19% 6 Indirect Support 7.09%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 48.07% 6.1 Installation Support 97.51%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 1.80%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 16.39% 6.3 General Training & Education 0.69%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.45%
KC-135E 1996-2009
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
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1 Unit-Level Manpower 33.14% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.48%
1.1 Operations 21.45% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 53.17% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 2.01%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 25.38% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 24.68% 4 Sustaining Support 1.30%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 81.98% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 9.81%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 60.93%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.89% 4.4 Program Management 0.50%
2.2 Support Services 4.74% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 10.01%
2.3 TDY 9.21% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 18.69%
2.4 Transportaion 0.18% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.07%
3 Maintenance 30.57% 5 Continuing System Improvements 5.97%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 9.50% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 89.17%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 18.81% 5.2 Software Maintenance 10.83%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.07% 6 Indirect Support 4.34%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 55.55% 6.1 Installation Support 77.07%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.83%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 13.23% 6.3 General Training & Education 19.10%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.36%
KC-135R 1996-2009
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1 Unit-Level Manpower 31.88% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.15%
1.1 Operations 30.37% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 52.18% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 2.12%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 17.45% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 28.19% 4 Sustaining Support 1.49%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 81.65% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 8.53%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 0.00% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 62.51%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 3.37% 4.4 Program Management 0.27%
2.2 Support Services 4.07% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 13.52%
2.3 TDY 10.83% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 15.15%
2.4 Transportaion 0.08% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 0.03%
3 Maintenance 29.13% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.71%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 7.79% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 83.96%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 16.97% 5.2 Software Maintenance 16.04%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.12% 6 Indirect Support 2.59%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 59.48% 6.1 Installation Support 82.58%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 9.18%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 12.73% 6.3 General Training & Education 8.24%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.64%
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
KC-135T 1996-2009
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Appendix K: Cost Element Structure Mean Percentages for UAV/Drone Platforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Unit-Level Manpower 33.05% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 51.31% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.08%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 28.85% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 91.98%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 19.84% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 24.55% 4 Sustaining Support 0.30%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 0.74% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 67.09%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 1.07% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 8.68%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 7.58% 4.4 Program Management 16.26%
2.2 Support Services 82.93% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 6.93% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 7.30%
2.4 Transportaion 0.75% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 5.05%
3 Maintenance 30.69% 5 Continuing System Improvements 6.76%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 7.61% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 84.99%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.05% 5.2 Software Maintenance 15.01%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.28% 6 Indirect Support 4.65%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 78.4%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 17.7%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 3.9%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
MQ-1B
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
1997-2016
1 Unit-Level Manpower 29.41% 3.5 Other Maintenance 0.00%
1.1 Operations 30.27% 3.6 Interim Contractor Support 0.00%
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance 54.44% 3.7 Contractor Logistics Support 99.34%
1.3 Other Unit-Level 15.29% 3.8 Other Contractor Support 0.00%
2 Unit Operations 14.66% 4 Sustaining Support 1.20%
2.1.1 Energy (Fuel, POL, Electricity) 2.80% 4.2 Support Equipment Replacement & Repair 10.05%
2.1.2 Training Munitions & Expendable Stores 9.28% 4.3 Sustaining/Systems Engineering 15.88%
2.1.3 Other Operational Material 6.64% 4.4 Program Management 71.60%
2.2 Support Services 73.66% 4.6 Data and Technical Publications 0.00%
2.3 TDY 7.37% 4.7 Simulator Operations & Repair 0.65%
2.4 Transportaion 0.26% 4.8.1 Other Sustaining Support (Testing) 1.82%
3 Maintenance 28.03% 5 Continuing System Improvements 21.00%
3.1.2 Repair Parts (GSD) 0.64% 5.1 Hardware Modifications 97.92%
3.2.1 DLR Fly 0.00% 5.2 Software Maintenance 2.08%
3.2.2 DLR NonFly 0.02% 6 Indirect Support 5.71%
3.4.1 Aircraft Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.1 Installation Support 76.8%
3.4.2 Missile Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.2 Personnel Support 3.2%
3.4.3 Engine Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00% 6.3 General Training & Education 20.0%
3.4.4 Other Overhaul/Rework Depot Repair 0.00%
MQ-9A
OSD-CAPE Cost Element Structure
2008-2016
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